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"The human species, according to the best theory I can form of it, is
composed of two distinct races: the men who borrow and the men who
lend."'
INTRODUCTION
The world's bifurcation into debtors and creditors has created yet another
class of people: those involved in resolving disputes between lenders and
borrowers. To promote reliability in financial dispute resolution, credit
agreements have generally provided that potential controversies will be
submitted either to courts in the bank's home jurisdiction,2 or to courts of a
major money center such as London or New York.3
In the alternative, parties to a financial transaction might agree to resolve
disputes between them by arbitration, thus conferring adjudicatory competence
on private rather than public decision-makers. Arbitration has long been
common in settling commercial4 and insurance5 disputes, where its use tends to
reduce litigation costs. In an international context, arbitration serves to level the
playing field where there exists a particularly acute fear of the other side's
"hometown justice."
In contrast to the commercial and insurance communities, bankers have
traditionally preferred judges over arbitrators. This should not be surprising. A
'Charles Lamb, Two Races of Men, in ESSAYS OF ELIA (1823).
2 In addition, banks sometimes reserve the right to pursue the borrower before other
competent courts, such as those at the borrower's domicile. See discussion of unilateral
clauses, infra at notes 147-61 and accompanying text.
3 See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN
AGREEMENTS (1995), at 126-3 1.
4
See generally cases discussed in THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES & MATERIALS ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1997); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, W. LAURENCE CRAIG,
WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1997); WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION (1995); IAN MACNEIL,
RICHARD SPEIDEL & THOMAS STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW (1994); W.
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1990).
5 See, e.g.,

Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 S.Ct. 1712 (1996) (declaring that in
a motion to compel arbitration in federal court, abstention in favor of state court not
appropriate); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. National Gypsum, 101 F.3d 813 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that in an arbitration of insurance coverage of bodily injury claims against
asbestos producers, preclusive effect of court decision must be arbitrated).
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debtor's default usually results from simple inability or unwillingness to pay,
rather than any honest divergence in the interpretation of complex or ambiguous
contract terms. Arbitration therefore may appear as an unnecessary invitation
to a "split the difference" award, reminiscent of King Solomon's famous threat
to cut the baby in two.6 Moreover, financial institutions with a security interest
over a debtor's assets will usually find it easiest to bring a court action where
the pledged property is located. Finally, going to court may also give the lender
the benefit of summary procedures for the enforcement of promissory notes and
other commercial paper obligations.7
Herd mentality and respect for custom provide other clues to the banker's
hesitation to embrace private adjudication. Not without good reason, the
financial sector has tended to be conservative, wary of rapid change.8 If suing
borrowers in court rather than before arbitrators has worked well enough in the
past, few bankers will buck the trend.
Increasingly, however, the financial community is finding benefits to
arbitration, particularly in connection with securities transactions, guarantees,
documentary credits, consumer loans, and public sector lending. This Article
will examine how arbitration has developed in each of these selected areas. In
addition, it will analyze the major elements in the efficiency calculus of
financial arbitration: (i) the multilateral treaty network for the enforcement of
arbitral awards; (ii) the arbitrator's ability to ignore "Act of State" defenses
arising from foreign exchange controls; and (iii) the risk of excessive American
jury awards with respect to both punitive damages and "lender liability" claims.
No dispute resolution clause will satisfy every segment of the financial
services industry. Rather, the interaction of all elements of a given financial
transaction will determine when and how arbitration may (or may not) be
appropriate to the resolution of banking and securities controversies. This
Article suggests, however, that arbitration merits special consideration when the
borrower's assets are found in jurisdictions lacking judgment treaties with the
probable litigation forum, when loans are subject to exchange controls, and
when debtors might file punitive damage or "lender liability" actions. ArbitraOf course, when Solomon called for a sword to divide the infant, he was rendering
only an interim award, designed to discover the real mother. See I Kings 3:24-25.
6

7 See, e.g., CODE DE COMMERCE [C.COM.], art.

641 (Fr.) (providing the Tribunal de

commerce with power to order an injonctiondepayerwith respect to promissory notes).
' For an analysis of factors that explain deference to the past even when it may be
inefficient, see Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV.

L. REv. 641 (1996).
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tion may also be appropriate when there exists a need for special expertise, such
as in the settlement of documentary credit disputes subject to the Uniform
Customs and Practicesof the International Chamber of Commerce.
To the extent that arbitration promotes respect for bargains between
creditor and debtor, it commends itself not only to the bankers' self-interest, but
also as a matter of sound international economic policy. The greater the risk in
loan recovery, the higher the interest rate. Because loans are loans, not gifts,
untrustworthy enforcement mechanisms will tend to chill cross-border economic
cooperation to the detriment of those countries that depend most on foreign
capital for development.

I. ENFORCING LOAN AGREEMENTS
At the outset, arbitration should be distinguished from other non-judicial
forms of alternative dispute resolution currently in vogue. Arbitration implies
not only the consent of the parties to settle their dispute out of court, but also
bindingness of result. On the strength of an arbitral award, assets can be
attached and competing litigation precluded.' By contrast, neither mediation nor
conciliation is legally binding; both may end up being little more than foreplay
to litigation.' 0
A. Treaties
Bankers sometimes must enforce court judgments in their favor against
assets located outside the country where the judgment was rendered. For
example, an American bank that obtained a judgment in New York against a

9 Samuel Johnson commented on the salutary effects of looming catastrophe: "[d]epend
upon it, Sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his
mind wonderfully." JAMES BOSWELL, 2 LIFE OF JOHNSON 110 (Mowbray Morris ed.,
Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1890).
10 Dispute resolution possessing a moral force only will be more effective in a closely
knit, ethnically homogeneous community with repeat dealings among community
members, rather than among culturally diverse and mutually suspicious (or even hostile)
commercial actors. See generally JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW (1983);
Lisa S.Bemstein, Opting Out ofthe Legal System: ExtralegalContractualRelations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
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foreign borrower might have to seek its enforcement against property in Europe,
Asia or Latin America.
Unfortunately, not all banks will benefit from an adequate treaty network2
recognition of foreign judgments. Although the Bruxelles" and Lugano
the
for
Conventions bless Western Europe with a sound mechanism to enforce each
others' court judgments, these treaties will be of no avail in recovering loans
against assets in non-treaty countries. Moreover, no treaties at all exist for the
enforcement of American judgments abroad. 3 While some countries might as
a matter of "comity" enforce a foreign judgment,' 4 not all legal systems will be
so generous."

I See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, arts. 13-17, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1990 O.J. (C 189) 2.
12 See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, arts. 13-17, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319)9.
13 The United States' failure to conclude any judgments treaty derives in part from our
trading partners' apprehension over punitive damages, civil juries, contingency fees and
other quaint aspects of the American judicial system. See generally WILLIAM W. PARK,
INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 46-49 (1995).
14See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 98 (1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, §

481 (1987);

UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS ACT § 3, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962); A.V. DICEY &
J.H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 418-508, Rules 35-53 (Lawrence Collins ed.,

SlIth ed. 1987);

15See,

e.g., WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [CODE CIV. PROC.], art.

431 (1) (Neth.) ("Except forprovisions ofArticles 985-94 [concerning treaties] decisions
rendered by foreign judges or public deeds executed outside the Netherlands cannot be
enforced in the Netherlands.") (Translation by Albert Jan van den Berg). See also
Danish Code of Civil Procedure § 223-a. Chinese procedure apparently conditions
judgment enforcement on an explicit "judicial entrustment" of the judgment by a
foreign court to a People's Republic of China tribunal. See Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Guowuyuan Gongbao [Foreign Economic Contract Law] Article 204,
publishedin 6 PEOPLE'S REPUBLICOF STATE COUNCIL GAZETTE 207 (1982) (discussed
in Andrew Kui-Nung Cheng, Enforcement of ForeignArbitralAwards in the People's
Republic of China,34 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 317 (1986)).
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In contrast, a worldwide network of bilateral 6 and multilateral' 7 treaties
provides for the enforcement of arbitral awards. The most important of these
treaties is the New York Arbitration Convention,"5 which requires courts of over
one hundred contracting states to enforce written arbitration agreements 9 and
the resulting awards,20 subject only to a limited litany of defenses related to
procedural matters such as the validity of the arbitration agreement, the
opportunity to be heard, and the limits of the arbitral jurisdiction.2
Many Latin American countries have adopted the Inter-American
Arbitration Convention (often referred to as the Panama Convention),22
sometimes in addition to the New York Convention. The Inter-American
Convention mirrors much of the New York Arbitration Convention, albeit with
a more limited enforcement scheme. 23
In addition, the Washington Convention has established an arbitration
procedure under the auspices of the World Bank's International Centre for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"),2 4 covering disputes arising out of

See RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
(1995).
16

See infra notes 18-25 for discussion of the New York, Panama and Washington
Conventions.
"8Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The
operation of the New York Convention is supplemented by the European Convention
of 1961, but only as between residents of European Convention countries. European
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Feb. 9, 1968, 484 U.N.T.S. 349
(Geneva).
19 New York Convention, supra note 18, art. 11(1), 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
20Id., art. III, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40 (requiring that a foreign award be enforced as would
be a domestic award).
17

2 Id., art. V, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.

Inter America Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Panama, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention].
23 The Panama Convention is silent on orders to compel arbitration, stating only that an
agreement to arbitrate is "valid." See id. Moreover, the Panama Convention provides
that execution and recognition of an award "may" be ordered, as contrasted with the
New York Convention's mandatory "shall." Finally, the Panama Convention's
enforcement obligation applies only to awards that are "not appealable;" no similar
limitation is found in the New York Convention.
24 Convention on the Settlement of Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter Washington Convention]. See
22
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investment contracts between a host state and a foreign national.25 Investment
treaties frequently contain consent to ICSID jurisdiction, and many define
investment to include "all categories of assets," including claims to money.26
27
B. Lender Liability

1. Claims by Debtors
A chameleon-like catch-word with several meanings, "lender liability" has
been pressed into service by non-performing debtors in the United States
seeking damages for a bank's alleged failure to act in "good faith,' 2 whether

generally MOSHE HIRSCH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE

INTERNATIONAL

CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES (1993); W. MICHAEL

46-106 (1992);
Georges R. Delaume, ICSID Arbitrationand the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784 (1983).
25 Washington Convention, supra note 24, art. 25.
REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

26

See RUDOLF DOLZER& MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 25-

31, 130-46 (1995). See also Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID
REVIEW 232 (1995). Consent to ICSID jurisdiction may be given in an individual
investment agreement, host state legislation or treaty obligations, but may not be
withdrawn unilaterally. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gives
investors a right to bring claims for expropriation under the arbitration rules of ICSID,
the ICSID "Additional Facility" or UNCITRAL. See NAFTA, art. 1120, ch. 11, § B
(1992).
27 See generally HELEN DAVIS CHAITMAN, THE LAW OF LENDER LIABILITY (1990);
GERALDL. BLANCHARD, LENDER LIABILITY LAW PRACTICE& PREVENTION

(1989); A.

Brooke Oveby, Bondage, Domination and the Art of the Deal: An Assessment of
JudicialStrategiesin Lender Liability Good FaithLitigation,61 FORDHAM L. REV. 963
(1993); Wemer Ebke & James Griffin, Good Faithand FairDealing in Commercial
Lending Transactions: From Covenant to Duty andBeyond, 49 OHIO ST. L. J. 1237
(1989); Daniel R Fischel, The Economics ofLender Liability, 99 YALE L. J. 131 (1989);
Dennis M. Patterson, GoodFaith,Lender Liability,and DiscretionaryAcceleration:Of
Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169
(1989).
28 On good faith in contract performance, see generally STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G.
ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH (1995); STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD
FAITH (1992); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS, 550-59 (2d ed. 1990); Christina

L. Kunz, Frontispieceon Good Faith:A FunctionalApproach within the U C.C., 16
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under common law 29 or statute. 30 Analogous regimes have been imposed in
some Continental legal systems.3'
The "lender liability" label has been affixed to duties owed by a creditor
to a debtor under theories of breach of contract, fraud and bad-faith in precontractual negotiation. Such claims typically arise at termination of a line of
credit, acceleration of payment under a note or foreclosure on collateral?2

WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1105 (1990); Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation
of Good Faith, 1981 DUKE L. J. 619 (1981); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and

the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666 (1963).
29 In the United States, the duty of "good faith" usually arises under state rather than
federal law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 205 (1979) (providing that

"[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement.").
30 See generally U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995) (providing that "[e]very contract or duty within
this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and its enforcement.");
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995) (defining "good faith" generally as "honesty in fact").
Certain portions of the Code extend the "good faith" definition to include the
"observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." See U.C.C. §§ 2103(1)(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 4A-105(a)(6) (1995). Although the Code
governs security agreements under its Article 9 (Secured Transactions), it is uncertain
whether the Code also covers other aspects of secured loans themselves.
31 Article 60 of France's Loi No. 84-46, Jan. 27, 1984, provides "Tout concours Adurde
indeterminde, autre qu'occasionnel, qu'un dtablissement de credit consent A une
entreprise, ne peut etre rdduit ou interrompu que sur notification dcrite et Al'expiration
d'un ddlai de prdavis fixi lors de I'octroi du concours." ("Any assistance with an
indeterminate limit, other than occasional, that a credit institution grants to an enterprise
cannot be reduced or interrupted except with written notice, effective at the end of a
period fixed at the time the credit was granted.") The Cour de cassation has held that
renewal of a fixed-term loan may create an indeterminate credit. See Cour de cassation,
Dec. 3, 1991, Revue Banque at 842 (1992) (commentary by Rives Lange). If a loan
does not contain a specific term, then the courts may deem a "reasonable" term to be
implied, which might extend the time required to find substitute financing. See, e.g.,
decision of Cour d'Appel d'Agen, D. 87, Jur. at 59 (note by Derrida). See generally
St~phane Astruc, La Responsabilitd Bancaire dans l'Octroi du Credit aux Entreprise
(1994) (unpublished thesis, Univ. of Paris) (on file with author).
32

See, e.g., Duffield v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 13 F.3d 1403 (10th Cir. 1993);
Bank One Texas v. Taylor, 970 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1992); Reid v. Key Bank, 821 F.2d
9 (1st Cir. 1987); KMC Co. v. Irving Trust, 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin
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Sometimes claims are made even when a bank exercises explicit powers under
a credit agreement." While bankers are most often criticized for being too
institutions have also been faulted for being overly
closefisted, 34 some financial
35
credit.
with
generous
To avoid what they consider to be excessive and unpredictable awards by
juries in such litigation, several American financial institutions now provide for
arbitration in credit agreements. 6 These institutions presume that an arbitrator

Specialty Vehicles v. Bank of Boston, 87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988), rev 'don
other grounds, 97 B.R. 721 (D. Mass. 1989); Fleet Bank of Maine v. Druce, 791 F.
Supp. 14 (Me. 1992) (letter of credit held a"contract" subject to good faith requirement
of U.C.C. § 1-203). Compare cases finding borrower's claim of bad faith not proven,

including Quality Automotive v. Signet Bank Maryland, 983 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1993);
Roberts v. Wells Fargo AG Credit Corp., 990 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1993) (duty of good
faith imposed by Oklahoma's "acceleration at will" statute did not cover refusal to
renew line of credit); Glenfed Financial Corp. v. Penick Corp., 647 A.2d 852 (App. Div.
N.J. 1994); Diversified Foods v. First National Bank of Boston, 605 A.2d 609 (Me.
1992); Baker v. Carroll County Bank & Trust, 90 Md. App. 761 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1992).
" Many states have now added credit agreements to statutes of frauds in order to
preclude lender liability claims based on alleged oral contract terms. See Todd C.
Pearson, Note, Limiting Lender Liability: The Trend Toward Written Credit Agreement
Statutes, 76 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1991).
"' See cases cited supra note 32.
35 Several American banks have recently come under attack for aggressive marketing,

allegedly making excessive loans on overpriced houses to low-income borrowers,
thereby bringing on foreclosure and bankruptcy. See, e.g., Lessons in Home Financing,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 1997, at A30; Bad Credit in Dorchester, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct.
28, 1996, at A14. Banks in the United States have also been subject to allegations of
insufficient lending in poorer communities, leading to remedial legislation in the form
of the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1996). The complexity of
mortgage lending to less affluent borrowers is explored in HILLEL LEVINE & LAWRENCE
HARMON, THE DEATH OF AN AMERICAN JEWISH COMMUNITY (1992).
36 See the model clauses adopted by Bank of California and Bank of America, reprinted
in JAMES R. BUTLER, ARBITRATION INBANKING (R.M.A. 1988). See generallyMICHAEL
L. WEISSMAN, LENDER LIABILITY: How TO PROTECT YOURSELF AGAINST UNWAR-

RANTED Surrs (1988). In June 1992, the Bank of America announced that it would
require all deposit and bankcard agreements to be submitted to binding arbitration under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association. See statement of Winslow Christien
(Senior V.P. and Director of Litigation), reported in World Arb. & Mediation Rep.
(BNA) 135 (July 1992).
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will be less swayed by solicitude for the borrower than will members of a civil
jury, whose own credit problems may cause them to empathize with the debtor.
2. Claims by Third Parties
Another incarnation of lender liability relates to a banker's duty toward the
borrower's other creditors. Bankers have sometimes been asked to pay their
debtors' bills, under the theory that the lenders were de facto partners in the
borrowers' ventures. 7 The plausibility of such claims usually turns on the
amount of control exercised by the financier over the management of the
borrower's business.
Lenders will not always be able to impose arbitration of such third party
claims, simply because a borrower's other creditors will not necessarily have
agreed to arbitration. Nevertheless, arbitrators sometimes do hear third party
claims, and their commercial sophistication has often led to reasonable
solutions. 8

17 See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990)
(security interest and role in borrower's- management created liability for hazardous
waste clean-up costs). For French analogues, see Article 180 of Loi 85-98, permitting
a court to impose liability on a "dirigeant de fait" of a bankrupt company. See Law
RelatingtoJudicialRehabilitaionandJudicialLiquidation(Loi relativeauredressment
etii la liquidationjudiciaresdes entreprises),No. 85-98, Jan. 25, 1985, Journal Officiel

de la Rdpublique Frangatse (J.O.), Jan. 26, 1985 (discussing "redressmentjudicaire").
Third party lender liability may also be based on general tort responsibility under
Articles 1382 and 1383 of the French Code Civil, requiring payment of damages for any
harm caused to another by intentional fault or negligence. See CODE CIVIL [C.CIV], arts.
1382-83 (Fr.).
38 See arbitration award in Schlumberger v. Duferco, I.C.C. Case 8465, reportedin 11
(No. 3) MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. C-1 (1997). The case arose as follows: in connection
with an oil drilling contract in Iran, Company #1 owed Company #2 for services
performed. Company #2 attempted to recover this amount from Company #3 (the "deep
pocket") which, through a separate contract, had helped finance the project. The

arbitrators rejected the claim against Company #3 in an award confirmed by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on Mar. 8, 1996, Civil Action

H-94-2409.
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C. Exchange Controls
When a country freezes or restricts payment of foreign currency
obligations,39 borrowers sometimes invoke these exchange controls as defenses
to loan recovery,40 on the theory that such controls constitute a foreign "Act of
State" to which courts must defer. Although principally an American obsession,
the Act of State doctrine exercises an influence well beyond common law
countries, given the large number of cross-border financial transactions
routinely subjected to the law of New York or to the jurisdiction of New York
courts.
The Act of State doctrine generally prohibits courts from questioning a
foreign government's behavior concerning assets within its territory.4'
Sometimes explained as a limit on judicial interference with the conduct of
foreign affairs,42 the doctrine might best be understood as a conflict-of-laws rule
that imposes foreign law even if such law is contrary to the public policy of the
forum.

43

Creditors sometimes avoid application of the Act of State doctrine by
virtue ofjudicial manipulation of the situs of the debt in question. Courts may
deem the debt to be located outside the territory of the country imposing the

39

On.exchange controls, see generally Article VIII(2), International Monetary Fund

Articles of Agreement; Dr. Klaus Peter Berger, Acts ofState andArbitration:Exchange
Control Regulations, in ACTS OF STATE ANDARBITRATION 99 (Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel,
ed. 1997); Ross Cranston, The FreezingandExpropriationofBank Deposits, in LEGAL
ISSUES OF CROSS-BORDER BANKING 93-107 (Ross Cranston ed., 1989).
40 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988), vacatedand
remanded, 495 U.S. 660 (1990), affd 936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1991); Garcia v. Chase
Manhattan, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1984); Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566
F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd on reh'g, 757
F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan 61 N.Y.2d 460 (N.Y. 1984).

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
443 (1987).
42See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
41

§

An alternative rationale sees the Act of State doctrine as promoting security of
transactions, an explanation that works best when tangibles are concerned. For example,
without the Act of State doctrine, one who buys wood or sugar from a revolutionary
government might later be subject to a claim brought by the original owner seeking to
43

recover the goods.
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exchange controls." Favorable characterization of the debt situs, however, may
come only after years of costly litigation.45
The United States has eliminated the Act of State defense in actions to
enforce arbitration agreements and awards. The Federal Arbitration Act
provides:
The enforcement of arbitral agreements, and the confirmation of
arbitral awards, shall not be refused on the basis of the act of state
doctrine.46
The scope of this remarkably succinct bit of legislation, however, has not been
extended to court litigation. Thus, an arbitration clause in a cross-border loan
agreement may enhance considerably a creditor's prospect of loan recovery.

D. Sovereign Immunity
To avoid repayment of loan obligations, government debtors often invoke
principles of "sovereign immunity," which operate to prevent one country from

"See Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd
733 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'don reh'g, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). Such situs

manipulation works best when the place ofpayment and/or applicable law are other than
the country of the debtor's residence. For alternative ways to analyze the legitimate
extent of exchange controls, see P.S. Smedresman & Andreas Lowenfeld, Eurodollars,
MultinationalBanks, andNationalLaws, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1989).

5For example, the saga of Wells Fargo's deposit at Citibank's Manilla branch involved
a half dozen separate federal court decisions concerning whether Wells Fargo could
look to Citibank's New York assets for recovery of a deposit that had been blocked
under Philippine law. See Wells Fargo v. Citibank, 660 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(recovery allowed), remandedforclarification,847 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1988), recovery
orderedagain,695 F. Supp. 1450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'a 852 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1988),
vacated& remanded495U.S. 660 (1990), reaffirmedonremand,936 F.2d 723 (2d Cir.

1991). Subsequent legislation provides that banks which are members of the Federal
Reserve are not required to repay foreign branch deposits blocked by foreign
government action, absent an express agreement to the contrary. See Federal Reserve
Act § 25C, 12 U.S.C. § 633 (1994).
46 9 U.S.C. § 15 (1994), enacted following a frustrating attempt to enforce an arbitration
award against Libya in American courts. See Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v.
Libya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated as moot, 684 F.2d 1032 (1981).
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hauling another country into its courts. The modem rationale for sovereign
immunity mirrors the justification sometimes given for the Act of State doctrine:
judges should not interfere with the executive branch of government in its
conduct of foreign relations.
Although most nations grant immunity to foreign governments and their
agencies, immunity is subject to several exceptions. As a general rule, immunity
covers "public" rather than "commercial" acts,47 with the character of an act
determined by its nature rather than its purpose.4"
Immunity from suit will be further restricted by an arbitration clause.
Many national legal systems deny sovereign immunity in an action to enforce
an arbitration agreement or to confirm an arbitral award.49
Arbitration can be of special benefit to a lender when an award must be
enforced against a sovereign debtor's assets in the United States. Normally, a
*functional connection is required between the property to be attached and the
activity that gave rise to the claim. A judgment against a foreign state can be
executed only against property used in the same commercial activity upon

47 See,

e.g., U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611
(1994); State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.). A Swiss wrinkle to sovereign
immunity requires a link ("internal connection"-Binnenbeziehung) between the
sovereign act and Switzerland before Swiss courts will accept jurisdiction over the
sovereign or its assets. See Circulaire du Department federal de justice et police, Nov.
26, 1979, reprintedin [ 1980] JURISPRUDENCE DES AUTORITES ADMINISTRATIVES DE LA
CONFEDERATION 224.
48 For the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1994). Legislative history indicates

that "both a foreign government sale of bonds and a loan from a commercial bank to a
foreign government are to be considered activities of a commercial nature." See H.R.
REP. NO. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 10 (1976). The British statute defines a
commercial transaction to include "any loan or other transaction for the provision of
finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction or of any
other financial obligation." See State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33, § 3(3)(b) (Eng.).
49 In the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1994). Compare Great Britain's State
Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33 § 9 (Eng.). The limit on jurisdictional immunity in the
United States has both a territorial and a treaty link. An arbitration agreement or award
will be enforceable notwithstanding a claim for sovereign immunity if(i) the arbitration
takes place in the United States, or (ii) the agreement or award is or may be governed
by a treaty calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(6) (1994). The latter would include the 1958 New York Convention, supra
note 18.
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which the claim is based." In the case of a loan, this "same activity" requirement can limit attachment of assets to funds earmarked for debt reimbursement,
which may be scarce when the debtor defaults.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,5' however, removes this
requirement of a functional nexus with respect to arbitral awards. The statute
provides that property of a foreign state used for a commercial activity in the
United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution if
judgment is based on an order confirming an arbitral award.5 2
An arbitration clause in a loan agreement can also be helpful when the
borrower is an international organization. In Britain, a dispute between the
International Tin Council (I.T.C.) and its creditors ended up before the House
of Lords, which interpreted the I.T.C. Headquarters Agreement with the United
Kingdom as granting the I.T.C. sovereign immunity. 3 The same Headquarters
Agreement, however, had also provided that the I.T.C. would not benefit from
immunity in the enforcement of arbitration awards. The metal exchanges among
I.T.C.' s creditors were thereby protected, since their trading contracts contained
arbitration clauses. Banks were in a different situation, however, since few
lenders had the foresight to incorporate arbitration clauses in their loan
agreements.
E. Interbank Disputes
1. Court Selection Clauses
Not all jurisdictions are user-friendly in matters of court selection. If two
banks wish an unbiased judge in a neutral third country to resolve a controversy
between them, the contractually-selected neutral court may not always have
enough links to the parties or the controverted event to justify hearing the case.
While some countries require their judges to hear cases pursuant to court
selection clauses,' others do not. In particular, no American jurisdiction except
0 Some property, such as central bank funds (absent an explicit waiver of immunity),
is always immune, unless perhaps the central bank functions as a commercial bank in
a particular transaction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-10 (1994).
5'28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1994).
52 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(6) (1994).
53 J.H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dep't of Trade, 3 All E.R. 523 (H.L. 1989) (Eng.).
54

See, e.g., Article 5 of the Swiss Loifidralesur le droit internationalprivi [LDIP]
du 18 dicembre 1987, which mandates respect for court-selection clauses as long as

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 17:213

New York mandates recognition of court selection clauses;" neither federal
statute nor treaty enforces choice-of-court clauses in the way that the Federal
Arbitration Act and the New York Arbitration Convention enforce arbitration
agreements.5 6
Several United States Supreme Court decisions are often cited for the
proposition that court selection clauses will be recognized."' Yet these cases
actually say only that jurisdiction agreements will be respected if "reasonable"
by reference to a multiplicity of factors (place of contract execution, place of
performance, location of witnesses and documents, remedies available in the
alternate forum, and public policy), all of which vary from case to case."
Moreover, unless a controversy implicates a question of federal law, one
foreigner normally may not sue another in federal court, regardless ofhow eager
the litigants are to thrust jurisdiction on the designated tribunal.59

Swiss law applies to the dispute.
55 See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney 1989) and N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 327
(McKinney 1989). For a New York choice of forum to be dispositive, the transaction

must cover no less than $1 million, and the parties must have elected application of New
York law. Without this statute, two foreign banks might have considerable difficulty
getting a New York court to hear their case. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 200-b
(McKinney 1990) and N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1314(b)(1)-(5) (McKinney 1987).
56 For a recent U.S. federal case citing absence of a court selection statute as a factor
justifying refusal to enforce a jurisdiction clause, see Richards v. Lloyd's of London,
107 F.3d 1422, 1427 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[The Court in Scherk] chose to apply the
Arbitration Act. It did not weigh reasonableness or pit amorphous policy against an act
of
Congress.").
5
7See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (199 1); Stewart Organization
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1
(1972).
58 One decision set forth nine factors relevant to the reasonableness of a jurisdiction
clause, emphasizing "the totality of the circumstances measured in the interests of
justice." D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708 (D.R.I. 1983). See, e.g.,
Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-32 (1988) (listing factors).
9 Federal court power is limited to cases arising on the basis of a federal question or
diversity of citizenship. The latter requires litigation between citizens of different states
or between a U.S. citizen and a foreigner. For a recent case discussing the complexity
of"diversity jurisdiction," see Dresser Industries v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London,
106 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1997).
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The situation is even more complex for state law,' which allows courts
to refuse to enforce court selection clauses either in general6 or with respect to
particular types of contracts.62 Even when acknowledging the validity of court
selection clauses in theory, state courts may in practice give such clauses a
restrictive reading that vitiates their effect.
Some court decisions have construed court selection agreements narrowly,
as excluding actions based on extra-contractual wrongs such as deceit and unfair
business practices. 63 Courts may also restrict the scope of a choice-of-court
clause by construing it as a nonexclusive consent to jurisdiction, therefore
allowing actions in competing fora.6"Whether a clause is exclusive (mandatory)
I State law may apply not only in state courts, but also in federal courts where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship between the parties. Some federal courts
see enforcement of a jurisdiction clause as a matter of substantive law, requiring
application of state norms in diversity cases under the principle of Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Other courts have assumed (often with little discussion)
that the matter is procedural and that federal law applies.
61 As of this writing, at least five states (Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Montana, and Texas)
continue to restrict enforceability of court selection clauses. Some Georgia cases have
endorsed court selection clauses (see, e.g., Harry S. Peterson v. National Union Fire Ins.,
209 Ga. App. 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)), although the Georgia Supreme Court has not
overruled its decision disapproving such clauses in Cartridge Rental Network v. Video
Entertainment, 132 Ga. App. 748 (1974). See generally WILLIAM W. PARK,
TIONAL FORUM SELECTION 35-36 (1995).
62 For

INTERNA-

a recent illustration of restrictive state law, see Kubis & Perszyk Associates, Inc.
v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 680 A.2d 618 (N.J. 1996), arising under the New Jersey
Franchise Practices Act (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-1 (West 1997)). The illfated jurisdiction clause would have sent parties to Santa Clara, California.
63 In one case, the trial judge was instructed by the state supreme court to determine
whether the "principal focus" of plaintiffs claims was for breach of contract or for
extra-contractual wrongs, with the result that to the date of this writing the case has not
been sent to the contractually selected forum. See Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc., 646
N.E.2d 741 (D. Mass. 1995).
" See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, 997 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1993)
(forum provision held to be non-exclusive due to use of permissive language); Brooke
Group v. JCH Syndicate, 663 N.E.2d 635 (N.Y. 1996) (jurisdiction clause permissive
rather than mandatory, therefore allowing dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds
of action by American insured against foreign underwriter). See also Medoil Corp. v.
Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (customer could sue Citibank only at
location of branch managing account, while bank could bring action also at customer's
residence).
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or nonexclusive (permissive) will depend on the intent of the parties as
determined by the contract language and context of the agreement.65 The
exclusivity of a forum selection clause may be either bilateral or unilateral. A
bilateral clause imposes a single court on both sides of the transaction, while a
unilateral clause limits only one party's jurisdictional choice. Banks have often
required borrowers to bring litigation at the bank's domicile, while preserving
66
the right to pursue debtors and their assets wherever they may be found.
The need for predictability in international business argues for the
presumptive exclusivity of a court selection clause, 67 although not all courts
follow this commonsense approach. Some decisions have stated that forum
selection clauses will be enforced as exclusive only if containing specific
language to that effect,6 while others have taken the opposite view.69 Wisdom,

therefore, calls for parties seeking exclusivity to provide that "all disputes shall
be decided exclusively by" or "any claim shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of' courts at the desired location.

65 CompareCentral

Coal Co. v. Phibro Energy, Inc. 685 F. Supp. 595 (W.D. Va. 1988)
(holding the relevant forum selection clauses to be exclusive), andFurry v. First Nat'l
Monetary Corp., 602 F. Supp. 6 (W.D. Okla. 1984), with Heyco v. Hayman, 636 F.
Supp. 1545 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), Leasing Service Corp. v. Patterson Enters. Ltd., 633 F.
Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and First Nat'l City Bank v. Nanz, 437 F. Supp. 184
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding the relevant clauses to be mere nonexclusive consents to
jurisdiction).
66 See discussion of unilateral arbitration clauses infra in Section IV. C.
67

See, e.g., Loifddiralesur le droit internationalprivi, art. 5 (Dec. 18, 1987) (Switz.)

(providing that "[u]nless stipulated otherwise, the court agreed upon shall have
exclusive jurisdiction." ("Sauf stipulation contraire, l'dlection de forum est exclusive./Geht aus der Vereinbarung nichts anderes hervor, so ist das vereinbarte Gericht
ausschliesslich zustandig.")).
68 Compare John Boutari & Sons v. Attiki Importers, 22 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Docksider Ltd. v. Sea Technology, 875 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1989)), and Utah
Pizza Service v. Heigel, 784 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1992), with Central Coal Co. v.
Phibro Energy, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 595, 598 (W.D.Va. 1988) (finding a clause mandatory
and stating that "[i]f the parties wished [the clause] to be permissive, they should have
drafted
it so that that interpretation would be clearly evident.").
69 See,
e.g., Central Coal Co. v. Phibro Energy Inc., 685 F. Supp. 595, 598 (W.D.Va.
1988) (finding the clause exclusive, the court said "[i]f the parties wished [the clause]
to be permissive, they should have drafted it so that that interpretation would be clearly
evident.").
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A court may also decline to hear a case on grounds of "inconvenient
forum" (forum non conveniens),0 due to the location of witnesses and
documents, or the drain on public resources. While one overworked judge might
enforce ajurisdiction clause to clear a crowded docket, an equally overworked
judge in the contractually-selected jurisdiction may decline to hear the dispute
on the basis that a more convenient forum may be found elsewhere. 7 ' This risk
is particularly significant in a transaction between two foreign entities, when the
controversy lacks sufficient connection with the state.72
2. Arbitration Clauses
Unlike judges, arbitrators rarely (if ever) refuse to hear a dispute because
offorum non conveniens or the parties' lack of diversity of citizenship. If the
parties can provide an adequate deposit to cover costs, professors around the
world can usually be found eager to supplement meager academic stipends by
serving as arbitrators.
Arbitration, of course, suffers from its own forms of uncertainty.
Particularly when consolidation of related claims becomes desirable, there will
be many disputes better litigated before courts than arbitrators. These drawbacks
of arbitration are discussed more fully below in Section V.

70

See generally GARY

BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES

289-369 (3d ed. 1996) (cited cases).
7' At least one circuit court, however, has held that signature of a valid court selection
clause constitutes a "waiver of the right to move for a change of venue on the ground
of inconvenience to the moving party." Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916
F.2d 372, 378 (7th Cir. 1990).
72 See Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd. (Eng.), 184 N.E. 152 (Mass.
1933).
COURTS
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II. SECURITIES73
A. Broker Misbehavior
Securities-related disputes involving broker-dealers now provide one of
the most frequent occasions for arbitration in the financial services industry.74
The explosion of securities arbitration in the United States dates from 1989,
when the United States Supreme Court finally permitted arbitration of securities
disputes in domestic transactions.75 In Britain, by contrast, courts never
displayed the same hostility toward arbitration of securities claims, 76 probably
because awards in domestic cases could traditionally be challenged on their
legal merits. 7

71 See generally Symposium, SECURITIES ARBITRATION:

A DECADE AFTER MCMAHON,
by Norman S. Poser
contributions
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1329 et seq. (Winter 1996), with
(at 1329), Richard E. Speidel (at 1335), G. Richard Shell (at 1365), Jeffrey W. Stempel
(at 1381), Bruce M. Selya (at 1433), Edward Brunet (at 1459), Stephen J. Friedman (at
1495), Marc I. Steinberg (at 1503) and Therese Maynard (at 1533). See also DAVID E.
ROBBINS, SECURITIESARBITRATION PROCEDUREMANUAL (2d ed. 1990); Shelly James,
Arbitration in the Securities Field: Does the PresentSystem of ArbitrationBetween
Small Investors and Brokerage Firms Really Protect Anyone?, 21 J. CORP. L. 363
(1996); David E. Robbins, Seven Deadly Sins that Lead to Arbitration Disaster, in

489,489-96 (photo. reprint 1993).
4 For 1994, the NASD reported 5,570 new arbitration claims filed under its Code of
Arbitration Procedure, up from 318 in 1980. See Deborah Masucci, Securities
Arbitration:A Success Story: What Does the FutureHold?, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
183 (1996).
" See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(Securities Act of 1933); andShearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). Earlier Court decisions permitted
arbitration of securities disputes in international transactions. See Scherk v. Alberto
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
SECURITIES ARBITRATION

76

See generallyJohn J. Kerr, Jr., ArbitrabilityofSecuritiesLaw Claims in Common Law
Countries, 12 ARB. INT'L 171 (1996). For a recent case involving securities arbitration

in the United Kingdom, see Philip Alexander Securities v. Bamberger, [ 1977] I.L.Pr.
73 (Queen's Bench Div.) (July 12, 1996) (distinctions in service of injunctions based
on nationality inconsistent with non-discrimination principles of European Union)
reportedin Exclusion Contraryto EC Law, TIMES, July 22, 1996, at 42 (Law).

1979 the "case stated" procedure permitted defacto challenge for error of law.
The 1979 Arbitration Act replaced the "case stated" procedure with a more limited right
77 Before
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Claims against brokerage firms usually relate to misbehavior such as
"churning" (needless buying and selling to generate commissions), unauthorized
or unsuitable trading, and misrepresentations. Occasionally brokers are accused
of outright theft, euphemistically referred to as misappropriation.
In the United States, arbitration reduces the cost and delay in dealing with
such disputes, and reduces the prospect of punitive damages awarded by procustomer juries. American brokerage firms' customer account agreements
usually provide that any disputes will be settled by arbitration. The customer
often has the right to elect among several sets of rules, including those of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA), the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)."8
Not all quarters have been happy with binding dispute resolution under the
securities industry's various arbitration rules. In particular, the fairness of
arbitration against brokerage houses has been questioned in connection with
employment-related claims as well as customer complaints.79 These critiques,

of appeal, which was not waivable in domestic cases until after the dispute had arisen.
See Arbitration Act, 1979, § 3 (Eng.). The 1996 Arbitration Act provides for appeal on
points of law, but allows waiver of this act. See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.).
Although the 1996 Act prohibited pre-dispute exclusion of such appeal in domestic
cases, this provision never entered into force, due to a perceived conflict with the nondiscrimination regime of the European Union.
78Under some rules, arbitrators are classified as either "public" (i.e., customer) or
"industry" arbitrators, with the latter category including broker-dealers and their
employees, as well as attorneys, accountants and other professionals with close ties to
the securities industry. See NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 19 (1995)
(excluding from the public arbitrator category professionals who have worked twenty
percent or more for the securities industry during the previous two years). A study
completed by the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO") has found no evidence of
pro-industry bias in such arbitration. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ARBITRATION: HOW INVESTORS FARE (1992).
SECURITIES
79 In at
least one case the judge ordered discovery into the adequacy of the New York
Stock Exchange arbitration rules to resolve claimant's discrimination claims. See
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass.
1997) (claimant alleging sexual harassment and discrimination), discussed in Margaret
A. Jacobs, Brokerage Arbitration System in Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 1997, at B2.
Ultimately the court denied the motion to compel arbitration, finding that Congress
intended to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements of discrimination claims brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and that employer's dominance of the NYSE
arbitration system made it inappropriate for vindication of civil rights claims. See
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which often raise questions about the voluntariness of the consent to arbitration,
are discussed in Section V(B) below.
B. Punitive Damages
When a wrong is aggravated by defendant's malice, fraud or wanton
conduct, civil juries in the United States often award punitive damages for
amounts over and above the plaintiff's actual loss.8" Arbitration provides one
way to reduce the risk of such damages.8 '
The securities industry has generally presumed that arbitrators will be
more reasonable (i.e., less generous) than juries in granting punitive damages.
In addition, the law of some states, including New York, prohibits arbitrators
from giving a claimant anything more than compensation for actual loss;
The United States Supreme Court, however, recently upheld an award for
$400,000 to punish broker misbehavior (in addition to $159,000 in actual loss)
notwithstanding that the agreement was governed by New York law, which
forbids punitive damages in arbitration. 2 InMastrobuonov. ShearsonLehman
Hutton 3 the Supreme Court read the relevant New York choice-of-law clause
to refer only to substantive contract law, to the exclusion of state arbitration
principles.

Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 96-12267-NG, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 1998).
80 On the Biblical origins of punitive damages, see Exodus 22:1 (requiring multiple
payments for theft).
81 In January 1997, the NASD Board of Governors approved a cap that will limit
punitive damages to the lesser of $750,000 or twice compensatory damages. See
REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

85,735,

§ V(B) [hereinafter Ruder Report, so named for Task Force Chairman David Ruder].
82 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976) (forbidding punitive
damages). Recently, however, at least one New York decision has allowed arbitrators
to award punitive damages unless the parties have unequivocally agreed otherwise. See
Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 224 A.D.2d. 125 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(reconsidering Garrityin light of the Mastrobuono decision).
83 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995). For a pre-Mastrobuonosurvey of the subject, see E. Allen
Farnsworth, PunitiveDamages in Arbitration,7 ARB. INT'L 3 (1991).
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The decision in Mastrobuono is hard to square with previous Supreme
Court pronouncements on choice of law in arbitration. A few years earlier, the
Court had upheld a stay of arbitration on the basis of a choice-of-law clause
deemed to incorporate California state law into the agreement to arbitrate."
Court decisions since Mastrobuono have sometimes distinguished the case on
the basis of forum public policy or the drafting of the choice-of-law clause, so
as to reject the arbitrators' power to grant punitive damages.85
Following Mastrobuono, the path of prudence for financial institutions
wishing to avoid punitive damages lies in explicit exclusionary language in the
relevant contract. Reliance on choice of law clauses alone will be unpredictable
at best.

C. Time Bars
Certain securities arbitration rules require disputes to be brought within
a fixed term after the controverted events. 6 At present, courts are divided on
whether judges or arbitrators should determine the application of time limits.8 7

14 See

Volt v. Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). In Volt, the U.S. Supreme Court relied on

a decision of the California state Court of Appeals, which interpreted the choice-of-law
clause in issue to cover California arbitration rules. See id at 470. In contrast, the U.S.
Supreme Court in Mastrobuono interpreted the choice-of-law clause de novo. See
Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1215.

Compare Dean Witter Reynolds v. Trimble, 631 N.Y.S.2d 215 (N.Y. App. Div.
1995), with Merrill Lynch v. Levine, N.Y. L.J., July 5, 1995, at 26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
86See NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS CODE OF ARB. PROC., Rule 10304 (formerly § 15)
(providing that "no dispute, claim or controversy shall be eligible for submission to
arbitration under this Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event
giving rise to the act or dispute, claim or controversy."). See generally Sean Costello,
Time Limits Under Rule 10304 of the NASD Code of ArbitrationProcedure: Making
85

Arbitrators More Like Judges or Judges More Like Arbitrators, 52 BuS. LAW. 283
(1996); Lawrence W. Newman & Charles M. Davidson, Arbitrability of Timeliness
Defenses: Who Decides?,J. INT'L ARB., June 1997, at 137; David Rivkin, Courts Differ
on Arbitrability of Time Limitations, ADR CURRENTS, Autumn 1996, at 21. Under

recently proposed changes to the NASD rules, the six year eligibility rule would be
suspended for a three year period. See Ruder Report, supra note 81.
" The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have considered time limits
contained in arbitration rules to constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration, to
be determined by courts. The First, Second, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held
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To justify their decisions, courts have relied on (and sometimes misapplied) the
United States Supreme Court'sdictaonthe arbitrators'jurisdiction to determine
arbitrability. 88
As a matter of policy, it is hard to see why or how anyone can have the
final say on the fulfillment of a condition that must occur prior to his or her own
appointment as a decision-maker! 9 Determining whether an individual is truly
an arbitrator, or only a shameless volunteer expressing a gratuitous opinion,
would normally be a function for the courts.
Courts have also struggled with analogous issues related to statutes of
limitations. Some decisions have held that statute-of-limitations questions are
for judges in the context of a motion to compel arbitration?' but for arbitrators
hearing the underlying claim. 9 This approach assumes two separate time limits:
one applicable to the principal agreement (to buy, sell, license, lease or lend)
and one applicable to the agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Since the
arbitrators' job is to apply the relevant substantive law to decide whether there
should be recovery, the arbitral tribunal may be called to determine whether
such recovery is permitted or barred under the statute of limitations contained

the matter to be for the arbitrator. See PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.3d 589, 601 (1st Cir.
1996) (summarizing cases, and holding that time bars applied to arbitrators, citing
language in NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE § 35 which permitted arbitrators

to "interpret and determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code."). But see
Merrill Lynch v. Cohen, 62 F.2d 381 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding time bars to be a matter
for courts to decide).
" See discussion of compgtence-compitence and FirstOptions v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995), infra notes 207-222 and accompanying text.
" One situation in which an arbitrator may render a binding decision on arbitral
jurisdiction occurs when the parties - subsequent to the arbitration clause at issue enter into an agreement submitting the jurisdictional dispute to arbitration. However,
alleged "arbitrability agreements" contained in the arbitration clause itself must be
approached with great caution. See discussion infra at Section V. E., "Arbitral
Jurisdiction."
9' See National Iranian Oil v. Mapco, 983 F.2d 485 (3d Cir. 1992) (looking to the
Federal Arbitration Act). Since the FAA does not specify a statute of limitations, the
court reasoned that it must borrow the most closely analogous one from state law under
the conflict of laws principles of the state in which the court sits. See id. at 492.
91 See id. at 491. See also Avant Petroleum v. Pecten Arabian Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 42
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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in the applicable substantive law. In some cases, of course, the applicable law
itself might reserve to courts the matter of timeliness.92
The parties' intent remains the pole star for analysis of who determines
whether preconditions to arbitration have been satisfied. To enforce the contract
as drafted, judges must examine whether a time bar was explicitly or implicitly
incorporated into the arbitration clause as a restraint on the arbitrator's power.
If so, only courts should have the last word on the matter.

III. SELECTED FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
A. Guarantees
Issuers of guarantees93 often find themselves bound by the dispute
resolution clause in the principal contract.94 For example, a guarantee in favor
of Company Y might incorporate by reference the arbitration clause in the
contract between Company Y and Company Z.95
General principles of contract interpretation (developed principally in the
areas of reinsurance, charter parties and construction) subject a guarantee to the
forum selection mechanism in the primary obligation. Whether the guarantor
Compare Smith Barney v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.2d 193 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that N.Y.
C.P.L.R. §§ 7502(b) and 7503(a) require courts to decide statute-of-limitations
questions), with PaineWebber v. Bybyk, 81 F.3d 1193, 1200 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding
that the Mastrobuono reasoning requires the choice of New York law to be interpreted
to refer to New York substantive law only, so as to exclude the New York procedural
law that sends statute-of-limitations questions to courts).
9' In particular, arbitration often arises when banks outside the United States issue "first
92

demand guarantees" (garantiesi premiere demande), which are payable on the first

demand of the beneficiary, without any condition (such as proof of the principal
debtor's default) other than the request for payment. On first demand guarantees, see
generally, ROELAND BERTRAMS, BANKGUARANTEES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 36-39
(1990); Bertrand Chambreuil, Arbitrage internationalet garanties bancaires, 1991
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 33.
' See generally Bernard Hanotiau, La Pratiquede 'arbitrageinternationalen mati~re
bancaire,in LES MODES NONJUDICIAIRES DE RtGLEMENT DES CONFLITS 67 (Bruxelles
ed., 1995); Bertrand Chambreuil, Arbitrage internationalet garantiesbancaires, 1991
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 33.
95 See

Compania Espanol de Petroleos v. Nereus Shipping, 527 F.2d 966, 969-73 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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will be bound by the arbitration clause in the principal agreement depends on
the parties' intent, which will normally be determined by reference to factors
such as the language of the guarantee, the relationship between the guarantor
and the principal obligor, and the reasonableness of characterizing several
documents as a single transaction." In order to promote uniformity of contract
interpretation, conflict-of-laws doctrine in some countries favors submission of
suretyships (whereby one person agrees to answer for the debts of another) and
other "accessory" agreements to the same law governing the principal
obligation.9"

9 See, e.g., United States Fidelity v. West Point Construction, 837-F.2d 1507 (11th Cir.
1988) (performance bond incorporated subcontract terms by reference); Ameritrust v.
Chanslor, 803 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (creditors of partnership can compel
arbitration by guarantor of partner's obligations); Hoffman v. Fidelity and Deposit
Company, 734 F. Supp. 192 (D.N.J. 1990) (arbitration provision in construction
contract incorporated into performance bond); 0 & Y Landmark Associates v.
Nordheimer, 725 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1989) (individuals who guaranteed obligations
of one partnership bound to join arbitration with second partnership); Lemme v. Wine
of Japan Import, 631 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York distributor sued New
York importer and Japanese alcohol producer that guaranteed obligations of importer;
Japanese producer deemed to have consented to New York jurisdiction by virtue of
consent-to-jurisdiction clause in contract between importer and distributor). But see,
Grundstad v. Ritt, 106 F.3d 201 (7th Cir. 1997) (reversing summary judgment
compelling Norwegian guarantor to arbitrate dispute arising from guarantee of noncompetition and payment obligation relative to cruise ship gambling concession; court
distinguished cases where separate document contained the guarantee from case in
which the guarantee was included beneath signature line of principle agreement);
Progressive Casualty Ins. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venezuela, 802 F. Supp.
1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); General Electric v. Toups, 644 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(guarantors held not to have consented to jurisdiction of courts selected in loan
agreement).
97

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 194 (1988); EUGENE
SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 18.27 (2d ed. 1992) (cited cases); Bernard
Audit, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt, § 797, at 633 (1991). Audit notes, however, that

this general rule presumes no contrary agreement by the parties.
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B. Documentary Credits
1. The Context: Trade Finance and Performance Guarantees
International business transactions rely increasingly on a payment
mechanism known as the documentary credit (or letter of credit) by which banks
promise to pay money upon presentation ofdocuments. The "commercial" letter
of credit insures a buyer's settlement of the purchase price. A "standby" letter
of credit guarantees the ability of one party to a transaction to perform a more
general obligation. In a commercial letter of credit the beneficiary presents
invoices, proof of insurance, inspection certificates and bills of lading. In a
standby letter of credit the beneficiary presents a document certifying that the
relevant obligation (for example, loan repayment) has not been performed.9"
The advantage of a documentary credit lies in its independence from the
underlying business relationship. A seller can get paid even if the buyer has
complaints about the quality of the merchandise, provided the documents
presented to the bank comply with the terms of the credit. To maximize
confidence in the credit, the promise of the bank issuing the credit is often
ratified by another financial institution (the "confirming bank") in which the
beneficiary of the credit may have greater confidence.
Bankers and borrowers being what they are, it is not surprising that
documentary credit transactions often give rise to disputes, not only between
banks and their customers, but also between issuing and confirming banks.
Controversies often result from differing interpretation of the letter of credit
terms, sometimes aggravated by allegations of fraud or bad faith. For example,
a buyer's bank in Paris might issue a letter of credit in favor of a seller in
Boston, confirmed by the seller's bank in Massachusetts. Later the issuing bank
might refuse payment, claiming that the requirements of the credit were not met
because the bill of lading lacked the mention "Clean on Board." The confirming
bank might respond that no such requirement exists under the Uniform Customs
and Practices for Documentary Credits ("UCP")." This disagreement on how

" See generallyBROOKE WUNNICKE, DIANE WUNNICKE &PAUL

TURNER, STANDBY AND

COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT (1996); JOHN DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETrERS OF

CREDIT (1986); Michael K. Madden & Carole E. Klinger, Letters of Credit: When Can
Payment Be Prevented Or Enjoined?, LETTER OF CREDIT UPDATE, July 1997, at 44.

99 See Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits, ICC Pub. No. 500
(1993) [hereinafter UCP]. Cases in which the arbitrator is called to decide only on the
basis of the UCP provide an interesting example of application of what has come to be
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to interpret the UCP might be surrounded by allegations that the seller never
actually shipped the goods, or that the issuing bank used funds that should have
gone to pay the credit in order to offset the borrower's unrelated indebtedness
to the bank. The following section examines a real life instance of how complex
letter of credit disputes can be.
2. A Cautionary Tale About Courts and Credits
If scholars tried to construct an illustration ofthe hazards of going to court
to settle a documentary credit dispute, it would be hard to beat Clarendon v.
° In Clarendon, a Swiss beneficiary of a letter of
State Bank of Saurashtra."
credit, issued by a state bank in India, had to pursue almost four years ofjudicial
proceedings, with three different court decisions, merely to obtain an appellate
order remanding the case to a lower court for disposition on the merits of the
claim.
The defendant raised legal questions related to alleged procedural defects
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: the court's "subject matter
jurisdiction," the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and the applicant's
arguable status as an indispensable party to the litigation. To the beneficiary,
these quibbles must have seemed arcane at best, and totally irrelevant to
interpretation of the letter of credit itself. The merits of the case hinged on
whether the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits requires
(as it does) that an issuing bank give prompt notice of refusal to honor a credit
by reason of discrepant documents, in this case a bill of lading dated a day
earlier than called for in the credit.' 0' Yet all that the appellate judge decided

called "international law merchant," or lex mercatoria.On lex mercatoria,see generally
essays contributed to LEX MERCATORIA ANDARBITRATION (Thomas E. Carbonneau, ed.,
1990); see also

UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS
DE LY,

(International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, 1994); FILIP

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA (1992); W. LAURENCE CRAIG,
WILLIAM W. PARK AND JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

ARBITRATION, ch. 35 (2d ed. 1990); FELOCDASSER, INTERNATIONALSCHIEDSGERICHTE
UND LEX MERCATORIA: RECHTSVERGLEICHENDER BEITRAG ZUR DISKUSSION OBER EIN

NICHTSTAATLICHES HANDELSRECHT (Schultess Polygraphischer Verlag Ztlrich

ed.,1989).
'0o77 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 1996).
1o1 Under the UCP the issuing bank must either hold the documents at the disposition
of the presenter or return them. See UCP, art. 14, supra note 99.
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was that the court below should not have dismissed the case on the basis of the
alleged procedural defects.
3. Contemplating Alternatives to Court Proceedings
a. Arbitration
To reduce the cost and delay of such documentary credit litigation, parties
to letters of credit sometimes agree to submit their controversy to arbitration
under the rules of an institution that has developed experience in documentary
credit disputes.0 2 Special care must be taken in drafting an arbitration clause for
a letter of credit, since the dispute may implicate more than two parties. For
example, if a controversy involves an applicant or beneficiary as well as the
issuing and confirming banks, the arbitration clause should provide for
consolidation of all claims before a single arbitral tribunal. Otherwise, a bank
may be caught in the middle between inconsistent results of multiple arbitral
and/or court decisions.
b. Expertise
Another response to potential documentary credit disputes would be
resolution by "experts" convened under the auspices of the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"). Developed through almost two years of
intensive deliberation by a working party convened by the Banking Commission, the "Rules for Documentary Credit Dispute Resolution Expertise"
("DOCDEX") took effect in October 1997 °3 The dispute resolution process
will be administered by the ICC Centre for Expertise in conjunction with the
ICC Banking Commission.
Under the DOCDEX rules, a request for dispute resolution may be filed
unilaterally by an aggrieved party, or jointly by all parties to the dispute. From
a list maintained by its Banking Commission, the ICC will appoint three

institutions include the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court
of International Arbitration, the American Arbitration Association, and the recently
created Institute of International Banking Law and Practice.
103 ICC Publication No. 577.
02 Such
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independent individuals who will render a decision on the basis of documents
alone."

Parties to a dispute submitted for DOCDEX resolution may consider the
decision to have moral force only. Absent a contrary choice, the decision will
be considered non-binding.'0 5 Consequently, courts are unlikely to apply
arbitration statutes or treaties to the DOCDEX process.
4. Distinguishing Experts from Arbitrators" 6
The DOCDEX insistence that its decisions are not intended as arbitration
awards raises the question of how exactly they should be characterized.
Notwithstanding.Shakespeare's suggestion that what we call something does not
matter, 0 " it does make a significant difference whether a contractually
designated decision-maker is characterized as an "arbitrator" rather than an
",expert." 108

An arbitrator's award generally will benefit from the network of
enforcement provisions created by multinational treaties and national arbitration
statutes. On the other hand, an expert's opinion can be enforced abroad only in
a new action under the relevant foreign law, subject to whatever contract

"4 The Rules cover only issues arising under the Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits or the Uniform Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursement under
Documentary Credits ("URR"). Thus an allegation of fraud would fall outside the scope

of the expert's mission. See ICC Publication No. 577.
05
The Rules state that the experts' decision "is not intended to conform with any legal

requirements of an arbitration award" (Article 1.3) and that "unless otherwise agreed a
DOCDEX decision shall not be binding upon the parties" (Article 1.4). See ICC
Publication No. 577.
o6 See generally JOHN KENDALL, EXPERT DETERMINATION (2d ed. 1996), at 195-217;
MICHAEL MUSTILL & STEWART BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 38-50 (2d ed.
1989); CHARLES JARROSSON, LA NOTION D'ARBITRAGE, §§ 202-97, at 112-57 (1987);
Doug S. Jones, Is Expert Determination a "Final and Binding" Alternative?, 63
ARBITRATION 213 (1997); Paul Michard, Introduction, MartindaleHubbell International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Directory (1996), at xiii-xiv (discussing the

expert determination process).
107 "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as
sweet." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 1, line 85.
log Analogous decision-makers are also known as "adjudicators," "evaluators," or

"appraisers."
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defenses may exist."0 9 Arbitrators will generally benefit from immunity from
suit for errors or omissions, while experts will not." 0 Under some legal systems
an arbitral award might be subject to appeal under statutory provisions for
judicial review on the merits of an award,"' while decisions of experts would
fall outside the scope of such appellate schemes. "2
It is easier to describe the consequences of characterizing a decisionmaker as an arbitrator than to describe how the characterization should be made.
The existence of a dispute and the adversarial nature of the proceedings are
often cited as indicating the exercise of arbitral rather than expert functions."'
Even if a dispute has arisen, however, a decision-maker may be characterized
as an expert rather than an arbitrator.
Criteria relevant to the characterization process will vary from country to
country. In general, however, courts usually seek analogies between arbitration
and judicial proceedings, on the assumption that arbitrators are substitutes for
judges. With respect to the substance of the dispute, experts tend to deal with
narrow questions of fact (such as post-closing purchase price adjustments or
consideration to be paid for a privately held investment), while more complex
legal questions would be given to arbitrators. In matters of procedure, arbitrators
are more likely than experts to adopt a decision-making mechanism with the

109

See generally Jean-Francois Bourque, L'Expdrience du Centre International

d'Expertisede la CCI et le Ddveloppement de I'ExpertiseInternationale,1995 REVUE
DE L'ARBITRAGE 23 1.

110 See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 29 (Eng.). See generally Julian D.M. Lew, Immunity of
Arbitrators Under English Law, in THE IMMUNITY OF ARBITRATORs 21 (Julian D.M.

Lew ed., 1990).
"1 See, e.g., Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.).
112 See, e.g., Jones v. Sherwood Computer Services, [ 1992] 1 W.L.R. 277 (Eng.) (review
of expert's decision only for fraud or failure to perform correct function). Cf Mercury
Communications v. General Telecommunications, [ 1996] 1 W.L.R. 48 (Eng.) (House
of Lords accepted review of expert's error).
"' It is sometimes said that the role of experts is to avoid disputes, while the function
of arbitrators and judges is to decide them. See Sport Maska, Inc. v. Zittner, [ 1988] 1
S.C.R. 564, 588 (Can.) (finding that evaluators of inventory of bankrupt company
cannot benefit from immunity as arbitrators). See also Yves Derains, et al., Cour
InternationaleD 'Arbitragede la Chambre de Commerce Internationale,120 JOURNAL
DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (J.D.I.) 1001, 1024 (1993) (comment by Dominque Hascher

discussing the award rendered in ICC Case No. 6535, involving a construction contract).
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basic attributes of a judicial proceeding. In the United States,'1 4 Britain," 5 and
on the Continent," 6 these procedural identification tags include hearings, the
application of law, an ultimate determination of legal liability and evidentiary
submissions from the parties.
Although the parties' label on their dispute resolution process may create
a presumptive characterization, it will not be conclusive. For example, courts
have denied New York Arbitration Convention coverage to the determination
break-up of ajoint venture, even though the process
of the price of shares at the
7
arbitration."
was labeled
Perhaps the best approach to distinguishing between an arbitrator and an
expert would be to focus on the substance of the claims rather than the nature
of the dispute resolution process. Reasoning teleologically, one might ask
whether the goals of an arbitration statute or treaty will be served by treating a
decision-maker as an arbitrator. Generally, arbitration law comes into play when
parties to a controverted event have agreed (or allegedly agreed) to abandon
recourse to courts in favor of private dispute resolution. In such event,
arbitration law aims to promote finality on the merits while safeguarding
minimum standards of procedural fairness. Therefore, arbitration would be the
proper characterization of a decision-making process when the questions posed
to the decision-maker approximate a request for judicial relief. For example, a
building contractor and his customer, fighting over the non-payment of a bill,
might ask the decision-maker: "Was the roof completed?" Or they might ask:

114 See, e.g.,

Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1910); Sanitary Farm Dairies
v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106 (8th Cir. 1952); Shepard & Morse Lumber v. Collins, 256
P.2d 500 (Or. 1953). See generally SAMUEL WILLISTON, 16A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 1919 (Walter H. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1976) (discussing commercial
arbitration agreements).
I"ISee generallyJOHN KENDALL, EXPERT DETERMINATION 198-99 (2d ed. 1996) (cited
references).
116 See CHARLES JARROSSON, LA NOTION D'ARBITRAGE, §§ 202-97, at 112-57

(1987). See also decision of the Swiss Tribunalfidgralin X et Y contre Z, Nov. 26,
1991, ATF 117 Ia 365. See discussion in PAOLO MICHELE PATOCCHI & ELLIOTT
GEISINGER, CODE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVt SUISSE ANNOTt 433 (1995)

(concerning the Loifidralesur le droit internationalprivi, art. 176 (Switz.)).

See, e.g., Frydman v. Cosmair, 1995 WL 404841 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1995). The
decision was rendered under Article 1592 of the French Code civil (arbitraged'un
tiers). As a consequence, the enforcement of the decision could not be removed to
federal court under 9 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205 (1970).
117
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"Does Customer owe $10,000 to Contractor?" An expert would be more likely
to answer the first question, while the second would normally be for an
arbitrator.

C. Debt Rescheduling and Public Sector Lending
A British economist reportedly remarked, "Ifyou owe a man £100, you
have a problem. If you owe him £1 million, he has a problem." Restructuring
a country's external debt often involves amounts so sizeable that the bank, not
the borrower, has a problem. Debtor nations may have enough economic muscle
to reject jurisdiction clauses designating the lender country's own courts. For
example, Brazil's rescheduling agreements accepted New York governing law,
but provided arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism."
Multilateral and bilateral public sector lending, both to states and state
enterprises, also have relied on arbitration clauses in loan and guarantee
documentation.' 9 The StandardTerms and Conditions of the European Bank
for Reconstruction andDevelopment adopt the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,20
and designate the International Court of Justice as the appointing authority.
The World Bank's General Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee
Agreements provide for arbitration under an ad hoc procedure.' 2 ' And FrancoIranian loans related to nuclear energy cooperation included arbitration clauses
11S See Deposit Facility Agreement between Banco Central do Brasil and Republica
Federativa do Brasil (as guarantor) and Citibank, N.A. (as agent), Sept. 22, 1988, §
12.08(a)-(o).
'19 In contrast, private sector lending by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development retains the option to elect, at the time of a dispute, either to arbitrate or to
sue the borrower in its country of residence. If elected by the Bank, arbitration will
proceed according to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with a situs in London and the
London Court of International Arbitration as the appointing authority. See generally
John W. Head, Evolution ofthe GoverningLawforLoan Agreements of the World Bank
and OtherMultilateralDevelopment Banks, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 214 (1996).
120 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, STANDARD TERMS

AND CONDITIONS

§ 8.04 (Sept. 1994). Other elements of the arbitral procedure provided

in the StandardTerms include a three member arbitral tribunal, the Hague as the seat
of arbitration, and proceedings in English.
See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, GENERAL
CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO LOAN AND GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS § 10.04 (Jan. 1,
1985).
121
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that were tested when the cooperation went sour after the Iranian revolution,
resulting in arbitration and ancillary litigation in both Geneva and Paris.'22
123
IV. DRAFTING THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE

A. General Principles
The cardinal rule of drafting an international arbitration agreement is to
avoid ambiguity and equivocation. Uncertainty about whether, where and how
the parties wished to arbitrate will delight only the party wishing to drag its feet,
and will often render the clause unenforceable. 4 Misguided lawyers invite
unnecessary litigation by providing that some disputes arising out of the contract
will be settled by arbitration, while others are for courts or experts.' 2 In some
cases defective clauses can be repaired by courts presuming the parties' intent

The French Atomic Energy Commission agreed to provide Iran with services,
expertise and access to uranium, in return for Iranian loans that totaled $1 billion. The
loan agreement signed by Iran was governed by Iranian law, but provided that any
disputes arising in connection with the agreement would be settled in Geneva under the
Arbitration Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce. See I.C.C. Arbitration
No. 3683 and 5124; Swiss Tribunalfidgral,C.E.A. v. Republique Islamique d'Iran,
ATF 116 II (May 17, 1990), reported in Semaine Judiciaire, No. 26, at 566 (1990);
Cass. le civ. (Fre.) (Judgment of March 20, 1989), 1989 REV. ARB. 653-67 (comment
P. Fouchard); Cass. le civ. (Fre.) (Judgment of June 28, 1989), 1989 REV. ARB. 653-57
(comment P. Fouchard). A separate French franc loan was made to a related entity
called Eurodif, with an award rendered on Dec. 20, 1990. See Eurodifest condammi h
payer 940 millions defrancs e l'Iran,LE MONDE, Jan. 1, 1991, at 16.
123 For implementation of these principles see Commercial Loan Model Arbitration
Clause, Appendix I(1), and for arbitration clauses used by international financial
see Appendix I(2)-(4).
institutions,
24
1 See Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat'l Mach. & Equip. Import & Export, 819 F.2d 247
(9th Cir. 1987). See alsoNational Iranian Oil Co. v. Ashland Oil, 817 F.2d 326 (5th Cir.
1987) (the court deemed itself without power to enforce an arbitration clause providing
for arbitration in Iran).
125 one sometimes sees, for example, provision for post-closing price adjustments to be
decided by experts, while the contract's general dispute resolution clause calls for
arbitration. Problems can arise when both experts and arbitrators hear allegations about
failure on the warranties.
122
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as to elements that are missing 12 or self-contradictory! 27 The indeterminacy of
the dispute resolution mechanisms, however, adds an unpleasant layer of
contention to business relationships.'
29
Some lawyers advocate pre-arbitration negotiation and mediation.
However, benefits sometimes attending such stipulations will often be
outweighed by added expense and delay when a recalcitrant party resists
arbitration or challenges an award by arguing that the terms of the negotiation
or mediation provisions were not met. For example, a defendant may allege that
the claimant did not negotiate in good faith, or that the request for arbitration
was filed too long after negotiation or mediation failed. 3 0
v. de Mdrd, 51 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that a court could compel
arbitration notwithstanding the fact that a contract failed to specify either location of
or method for appointing arbitrators).
arbitration
27
126 See Jain

1 See Paul Smith Ltd. v. H & S Int'l Holding Inc., [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 127 (1991)
(Eng.) (contract provided for both arbitration and submission to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the courts of England; reference to English courts was interpreted as a
specification of the curial law governing the arbitration, covering matters such as
interim measures of protection, vacancies in the arbitral tribunal and the removal of
arbitrators for misconduct).
12 Compare Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458 (9th
Cir. 1983) (language calling for arbitration of "any disputes arising hereunder"in ajoint
venture agreement held not to cover claim of inducing breach of contract under related
agency contract), with J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile S.A., 863 F.2d
315 (4th Cir. 1988) (standard I.C.C. clause providing for arbitration of "all disputes
arising in connection with" a distribution agreement held to cover controversies related
to ancillary agreements between the parties, as well as claims related to defendant's
interference with contracts between plaintiff and its customers), and S.A. Mineracao da
Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984) (clause providing for
arbitration "whenever any question or dispute shall arise or occur under" the agreement
held broad enough to include claims of fraudulent inducement to contract).
129See, e.g., MODEL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION CLAUSE FOR COMMERCIAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTE RESOLUTION , reprinted in Donald Rome, A New

Approach to ADR for the FinancialServices Industry, ADR CURRENTS, Spring 1997,
at 14-16 (report developed by a joint committee composed of the ADR Committee of
the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers and the American Arbitration
Association).
130 See, e.g., Swiss Tribunalfiddraldecision in Vekoma v. Maran Coal Company, Aug.
17, 1995, reprinted in 14 (No. 4) ASA BULLETIN 673 (1996) (Swiss Arb. Ass'n)
(commentary by Philippe Schweizer). The contract to ship coal in this case provided for
any dispute to be resolved by ICC arbitration in Geneva, subject to the condition that
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In addition to an unambiguous submission to arbitration of all disputes
connected with the contract, other aspects of an arbitration clause include: (i) a
workable mechanism for appointing arbitrators; (ii) designation of the place of
arbitration; (iii) the standard for fixing the arbitrators' fees; (iv) the language of
the arbitration; and (v) the number of arbitrators. Additional items that are
usually helpful include a choice-of-law clause (both substantive and
procedural 3 '), provisions for pre-award attachment and interim judicial
injunctive relief, and automatic consolidation of related arbitral proceedings.
Finally, it is occasionally useful to provide qualifications for arbitrators,
clarification of the arbitrator's power to grant punitive damages and to allocate
attorney's fees, a "last best offer" procedure (so-called baseball arbitration) and
a requirement of reasoned awards.
Many of these items will be covered by reference to the procedural rules
of an arbitral institution. 3 2 Among the more widely known institutional rules are
those of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), The International

the claim be filed "within thirty days after it was agreed that the difference or dispute
cannot be resolved by negotiation." An arbitration claim filed in May 1992 resulted in
an award for the claimant, which defendant succeeded in having annulled on the basis
that the claim was not brought within the contractually required thirty days from the
breakdown of negotiations. The defendant argued that the trigger event (failure of
negotiations) had occurred in January, when a letter from the claimant was met with
silence.
131 Issues related to the arbitration and the arbitration agreement should be decided
under the law of the arbitral situs. When the law selected to interpret the principal
contract is applied to the arbitration clause as well, a court asked to recognize an
arbitration clause in one jurisdiction (e.g., in New York) may sometimes stay arbitration
until the validity of the clause is determined by a tribunal in the country whose law was
selected (e.g., Venezuela). See Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria y Ayuda
Tecnica, 945 F. Supp 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court ultimately granted Pepsico's
motion to compel arbitration after a decision on the validity of the arbitration clause by
a court in Caracas. See Pepsico v. Ayuda Tecnia, No. 96-CIV-7817 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
1997), reprinted in 12 (No. 3) MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REPs. 16 (March 1997). The
arbitral tribunal awarded Pepsico $94 million for breach of contract. See 8 World Arb.
& Mediation Rep. (BNA) 210 (1997). See also Volt Info Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (holding that California state law
applies to both the merits of the dispute and the arbitration procedure, thereby staying
an arbitration under California state law pending resolution of related court proceedings).
32
See Appendix I.
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Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") and the London Court of International
Arbitration ("LCIA"). Other useful arbitration rules include those of the Geneva
Chamber of Commerce and Industry ("GCCI"),the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").

B. The Arbitral Situs
In international arbitration, the choice of an arbitral situs may be the most
important component of the arbitration agreement other than the process for
selecting the arbitrators. The significance of the place of arbitration rests on a
twofold reality. First, national arbitration statutes usually provide some grounds
for setting aside awards made within their territory. Second, annulment at the
arbitral situs gives the loser an argument for resisting the award's enforcement
under the New York Arbitration Convention.
As the place where the award is considered "made" for purposes of the
Convention's enforcement scheme, 3' the arbitral situs can by vacatur of an
arbitral award impair 3 4 (but not necessarily destroy') an award's international
currency. For example, an award rendered in Boston might be presented for
enforcement against the loser's assets in London. If set aside by a court in

Occasionally there may be divergence between the arbitral seat and the place the
award is deemed made. See Hiscox v. Outhwaite, [1992] 1 App. Cas. 562 (Eng.)
(concluding that an award signed in Paris was considered made in France under the New
York Convention, while the seat of the arbitration remained in England for purposes of
appeal). The result of this case has been overruled by the Arbitration Act, 1996 (Eng.).
134 New York Convention, art. V(1)(e) provides that an award may be refused
recognition and enforcement if set aside "by a competent authority of the country in
which.., that award was made."
135 New York Convention, art. VII preserves the right to rely on awards under the local
law of the enforcement forum, whatever that law might be. Although rare, it does
sometimes happen that courts recognize awards set aside at the arbitral situs. See, e.g.,
Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1996) (award set aside
in Egypt recognized in the United States); and Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de traitement
et de valorisation, Cour de Cassation (June 10, 1997) (Fre.) (award set aside in
Switzerland recognized in France). Both decisions are discussed in Ch. 28 of W.
133

LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE ARBITRATION

(3d ed. 1998).
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Massachusetts, the award would no longer benefit from the New York
Convention's enforcement obligation.
Although the New York Convention permits a court to refuse recognition
to an award annulled where rendered, the Convention sets forth no particular
grounds for such annulment. For better or for36 worse, each country is free to
establish grounds for annulment as it sees fit.'
Judicial review of awards under national law at the place where rendered
(as contrasted with the enforcement forum) falls into several categories. The
first model allows appeal on the legal merits, as well as for procedural
irregularities such as arbitrator bias and excess of authority. The second limits
courts to review of procedural fairness only. Under a third but less popular
paradigm, the arbitral situs provides no grounds at all on which an award may
be set aside.' 37 Under the arbitration law of many countries, grounds forjudicial
review are hybrids of the above paradigms. For example, English law allows
judicial review on the legal merits of an award, but permits the parties to
contract out of such court intervention.' Switzerland's federal conflict-of-laws
code provides for courts to review the basic procedural integrity of the arbitral
process, but in some circumstances permits waiver of the right to challenge an
1 39
award.
The best place for arbitration is normally in a country where the judiciary
will safeguard the procedural integrity of the arbitral process, but not insist on
correcting an arbitrator's honest mistake on the substantive merits of the
dispute. A right of appeal on points of law tends to maximize judicial certainty,

But see European Convention on International Arbitration, art. IX (Geneva 1961)
(permitting nonrecognition of an award annulled where rendered only ifannulment was
for one of the treaty-enumerated reasons, which include an invalid arbitration
agreement, inability to present one's .case, an arbitrator's excess of authority and
irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal) [hereinafter European Convention]. See
also, William W. Park, National Law and CommercialJustice, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647,
686-689 (1989). The European Convention applies only as to disputes between
nationals of different contracting countries. See id
"' CompareCode Judiciaire, art. 1717 (Belg.), with Loifdddralesur le droit internationalprivd, art. 192 (Switz.) (conflict-of-laws code permitting, but not mandating, a
similar exclusion of all judicial review in some cases).
38
"See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.).
139 See Loifidralesur le droit internationalpriv9, arts. 190, 192 (Switz.) (permitting
waiver only when no Swiss party is involved, and even then only through an explicit
agreement (dclarationexpresse)).
136
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but only at the price of finality. In arbitration the parties assume some risk of a
"bad award," where an arbitrator gets it wrong on the facts or the law. However,
the parties do not usually (if ever) agree to arbitrator excess of authority, bias,
or departure from fundamental procedural fairness.
Courts in France, 4" Switzerland, 4 ' and the United States, 4 2 as well as
countries that follow the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, 43 all provide for
judicial monitoring of an arbitration's procedural regularity, but do not allow
appeal on the award's substantive legal merits." England's recently adopted
Arbitration Act allows review of jurisdictional matters and procedural
also permits appeal on points of law unless otherwise agreed by
fairness, 4 5 but
46
the parties. 1
47
C. Unilateral Clauses

From the perspective of litigation strategy, a lending institution would
4
normally want to reserve an option either to elect arbitration or to go to court. 1 8
Such a unilateral right to arbitrate permits significant flexibility with respect to
elements that are hard to forecast when a contract is signed. For example, a

0

14

See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.], art. 1502 (Fre.).

See Loifeddrale sur le droit internationalprivd, art. 190 (Switz.). In some cases
parties may opt to exclude any judicial review. See id., at art. 192. Under cantonal law,
however, arbitral awards may be set aside for "evident violation of law or equity." See
Concordat, art. 36(f) (Switz.).
Intercantonal
142 See 9 U.S.C. §10 (1994).
141 See generally,HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN AND JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY (1989).
'44France and Switzerland, as well as the UNCITRAL Model, also list "public policy"
(ordrepublic)as a ground for challenge to awards. The appropriateness of public policy
as a basis for setting aside an award where rendered (as opposed to refusal to enforce
the award at the asset situs) is open to question.
14 See Arbitration Act, 1996, §§ 67-68 (Eng.) (discussing substantive jurisdiction and
irregularity, respectively).
serious
146 See id. at § 69.
14

" See generally Laurent A. Niddam, UnilateralArbitration Clauses in Commercial
Arbitration, 1996 ARB. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 147 (1996).

For an example, see private sector lending practice of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
148
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lender may want to assess, after a dispute arises, whether extensive documentary discovery is in its interest. If not, the lender would elect arbitration, with the
concomitant likelihood of less discovery.
Whether such optional clauses will be enforceable is not entirely certain.
Rightly or wrongly, some courts have sometimes invoked the principle of
"mutuality" (of remedy or obligation) to invalidate a one-sided arbitration
agreement, under the theory that if both parties are not bound, then neither is
bound.

49

Other courts have been willing to enforce optional clauses. 150

Looking to choice-of-court clauses for analogies, it has long been
commonplace for financial institutions to impose a double standard in forum
selection.15 ' In such arrangements the bank reserves the right to sue customers
at their domiciles, but requires litigation against the bank to be brought only in
the contractually chosen forum, usually the place of the bank's headquarters or
designated branch office. The Bruxelles and Lugano Conventions seem to admit

149

See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that

arbitration clause in employment agreement subject to New York law was not
enforceable because employer retained right to go to court). This result would probably
be different today in light of Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 138-39 (N.Y.
1989). See also R.W. Roberts Construction v. St. John's River Water Mgt. Dist., 423
So.2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding unenforceable an arbitration clause
requiring arbitration of sub-contractor's claims against the general contractor); Lopez
v. Plaza Finance, 1996 WL 210073 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding arbitration clause
unenforceable in installment loan agreement where debtor could not arbitrate disputes
related to events of default); Stirlen v. Supercuts, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. App. Ct.
1997) (employment contract); Stevens, Leinweber, Sullens Inc. v. Holm Dev. and
Management, Inc., 795 P.2d 1308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding unenforceable an
arbitrator's provision granting one party a unilateral option to arbitrate).
0 See Doctor's Assoc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995); Becker Autoradio
v. Becker Autoradiowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1978); Cindy's Candle Co.
v. WNS Inc., 714 F. Supp. 973 (N.D. Ill. 1989); W.L. Jorden & Co. v. Blythe Industries,
Inc., 702 F. Supp. 282 (N.D. Ga. 1988); Sablosky v. Gordon Co., 73 N.Y.2d 133, 13839 (N.Y. 1989); Willis Flooring v. Howard S. Lease Const. Co., 656 P.2d 1184 (Alaska
1983); Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle Inc., 481 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. 1984).
See also Cole v. Bums Intem. Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (accepting the
validity of an arbitration clause in an employment contract excercisable at the
employer's option, but on condition that employer pay the arbitration fees), discussed
infra at note 172.
1"See discussion of exclusive and non-exclusive court selection clauses, supra note 65
and accompanying text.
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law enforcing a contractual right
unilateral jurisdiction selection,' as does case
53
to choose between several different courts.
The principle of mutuality can work both ways. In at least one case
mutuality was pressed into service to justify enforcement of a forum selection
clause for the benefit of a defendant who was not a party to the agreement. 5 4

V. UNCERTAINTIES IN FINANCIAL ARBITRATION
A. The International Monetary Fund Agreement
The Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund ("IMF")
may in some cases circumscribe an arbitrator's power to hear a dispute. The
IMF Articles prohibit member states from imposing exchange controls on
current transactions, absent IMF approval.' 55 However, controls which do
comply with the IMF Agreement must be respected. 56
Certain countries have given the IMF restrictions a broad interpretation,
applying them to any contract that affects international balance of payments,
including loan agreements between residents and non-residents.5 7 By contrast,
152

See Bruxelles Convention, art. 17(4).

15 See, e.g., Medoil Corp. v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (customer
could sue Citibank only at location of branch managing account, while bank could bring
action also at customer's residence).
54 See Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 827-28 (7th Cir. 1995). The defendant
brokerage firm, who was not a party to contracts between investors and promoters of
a commodities investment pool, was permitted to rely on the contractual choice of a
German forum in order to preclude action in the United States for allegedly operating
a Ponzi scheme. Judge Posner rejected the "asymmetry of procedural choices." Id.
155 See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Jul. 22, 1944, art.
VIII, § (2)(a) [hereinafter I.M.F. Agreement]. Current transactions include interest on
and payments of moderate amounts for loan amortization.
loans
15 6 See I.M.F. Agreement, supranote 155, art. VIII, § (2)(b) (providing that "exchange
contracts" contrary to valid exchange controls shall be unenforceable). Debate has
focused on whether to interpret "exchange contract" broadly to cover all agreements
affecting balance of payments, including cross-border loans.
157 See, e.g., De Boer, Widow Moojen v. Von Reichert, 1962 J.DROIT INT'L 718 (Paris,
June 20, 1961) (Fre.); Lessingerv. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725 (1955) (Ger.); Soci6td Filature
et Tissage X Jourdain v. Epous Heynen-Bintner, 22 I.L.R. 727 (Lux.). See also P.
CRESSWELL ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING LAW

§ F1604(b) (London 1987);
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a narrower interpretation of the IMF Articles limits its application to contracts
that involve the swap of one currency for another.'
The broad application of the IMF Articles has two consequences for crossborder financial arbitration. First, exchange controls (if properly imposed)
arguably apply regardless of the applicable law chosen by the parties. Like other
mandatory norms of international public policy (often referred to as lois de
police), legitimate exchange controls would seem to be non-waivable.'5 9
Second, national courts might refuse to enforce arbitration agreements
implicating exchange controls, on the ground that the subject matter is "not
capable of settlement by arbitration" under the New York Convention. " Some
authors, however, have taken the position that the IMF Articles ought not to
constitute such a bar to the arbitrability of international loan disputes. 6 '
Of course, if an arbitrator interprets an agreement in a way that violates
the IMF Agreement, courts might later refuse recognition to the award. But this
does not mean that the arbitrator should be prohibitedab initiofrom interpreting
the IMF Articles. The need for a level playing field on which to resolve disputes
over transnational loans argues for allowing arbitrators to hear the merits of
cross-border credit controversies, and leaving courts to deal with public policy
implications after the award is rendered.

Joseph Gold, Article VI11, Section 2(b) ofthe I.M.F.Articles in its InternationalSetting,
6 LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCE 65, 86 (1989); Bernard Audit, Note, 1966
J. DROIT INT'L 102 (commenting on two judgments by the French Cour de cassation).
" See, e.g., Libra Bank, Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); United City Merchants v. Royal Bank of Canada, [19831 App. Cas.
168 (U.K.).
159 See, e.g., BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT INT'L PRIVt §§ 92-113 (1991); Pierre Mayer,
MandatoryRules ofLaw in InternationalArbitration,2 ARB. INT'L 274 (1986); Pierre
Mayer, Les Lois de PoliceEtrangares, 1981 J. DRorr INT'L 277 (1981).
'See New York Convention, supra note 18, arts. 11(1), V(2)(a).
161See Otto Sandrock, InternationaleKredite une die InternationaleSchiedsgerichtsbarkeit, 48 (Nos. 10,11) ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTS UND BANKRECHT (Mar. 12,

1994); William W. Park, L 'arbitrageet le recouvrement des prdts consentis ai des
dibiteurs6trangers,37 REVUE DE DROIT DE L'UNIVERSITt MCGILL 375 (1992). These

authors note that courts have shown an increasing tendency to recognize arbitration of
other public-law issues and to enforce arbitration agreements in international contracts
even ifthe subject matter would make the agreement unenforceable in a purely domestic
context.
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162
B. Consumers, Employees and Informed Consent

Like any freedom, the right to choose a dispute resolution mechanism
justifies itself by the values it furthers. Arbitration in some cases promotes fairer
and more efficient adjudication, while in others it can deprive an unsophisticated party of basic procedural safeguards.
Arbitration against banks and securities firms has been subject to special
scrutiny. 63 Some courts have refused to enforce arbitration clauses in consumer
loan contracts. t64 Others have upheld consumer finance arbitration
agreements. 63 The heart of the matter seems to be whether such arbitration
agreements are genuinely consensual.166
See also discussion of "separability" and competence-competence, infra at Section
V.E., which deals with the timing of how courts consider issues of consent and
unconscionability.
163 In at least one case the judge ordered discovery into the adequacy of the New York
Stock Exchange arbitration rules to resolve claimants' discrimination claims and the
circumstances surrounding claimant's agreement to arbitration (phrased as "waiver of
her rights to a federal forum"). See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch Pierce, 965 F. Supp. 190
(D. Mass. 1997) (discussed supranote 79).
64
1 See Bell v. Congress Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. App. 4th 1675 (Cal. App. 1st Dist., May
17, 1994), ordered depublished 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (1994) (refusing to compel
arbitration absent a "clear and informed" waiver of the right to a jury trial when a
homeowner claims against mortgage lenders for fraudulent business practices). See also
Lopez v. Plaza Finance Co., 1996 WL 210073 (N.D.IIl. 1996) (no enforcement of
arbitration agreement in installment loan); ITT Cons. Fin. Corp. v. Patterson, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 563 (1993) (arbitration clause used in documentation for relatively small loans
was an unconscionable limit on the borrower's opportunity to be heard).
165 See, e.g.,Badie v. Bank of America, 1994 WL 660730 (Cal.Super. 1994); discussed
in 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 293 (Aug. 29, 1994) and 5 World Arb. & Mediation Rep.
(BNA) 231 (Oct. 1994); McCarthy v. Providential Corp., 1994 WL 387852 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (senior citizen "reverse mortgage"); Meyers v. Univest Home Loan, 1993 WL
307747 (N.D.Cal. 1993) (consumer loan).
'66 In one case, borrower's counsel remarked that arbitration "is like sex: it's great if
both parties consent, but can't be allowed if one party is forced into taking part." See
162

ConsumerArbitration,4 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. (BNA) 192, 193 (1993) quoting
Patricia Sturdevant, attorney for the plaintiffs in Badie v. Bank of America, 1994 WL
660730 (Cal.Super. 1994); discussed in 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 293 (Aug. 29, 1994)
and 5 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. (BNA) 231 (Oct. 1994). Attorney Sturdevant
applied her comment generally to "ADR" (alternative dispute resolution), a broad
category that includes arbitration as well as other alternatives to judicial dispute
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Courts have looked to see that the contractually designated arbitral process
is fundamentally fair. A self-administered dispute resolution system allowing
for inordinate delay, 16 7 and an arbitral regime requiring a disproportionately high
filing fee,"6 have been held unenforceable.
Courts struggling with arbitration in non-banking consumer transactions
have reached similarly inconsistent results, sometimes holding arbitration
clauses void for lack of informed consent,'69 while other times recognizing the
0
At least two cases have enforced arbitration clauses packaged in boxes
clause. 17
resolution.
167 See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (subjecting a
malpractice claim against a health care provider in the Kaiser group to an arbitration
clause). The ad hoc nature of the arbitration, which left administration to the parties
rather than an independent institution, resulted in delay that caused a procedural
asymmetry favoring the defendant health care provider. See id. The trial court found
fraud in the inducement, and thus allowed the deceased patient's heirs to rescind the
agreement to arbitrate. See id The Court of Appeals decision to reverse the trial court
was itself reversed by the Supreme Court of California, which remanded the case back
to the trial court after finding that the habitual delays in the process constituted evidence
of fraud by Kaiser. See id.
168 See Teleserve Sys. v. MCI, 659 N.Y.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). Teleserve
entered into an agreement to serve as MCI's agent in marketing MCI services. The court
found unconscionable an agreement that included a clause providing for arbitration
under the rules of the "Endispute" organization (in Washington, D.C.), which required
a filing fee based on the amount in dispute, which in the case at bar would have
amounted to $ 204,000 on claimant's request for $ 40,000,000 in compensatory
damages.
169 See Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997), and Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Lai 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). Both cases involved sexual harassment and
discrimination claims by employees who signed "U-4" form (Uniform Application for
Securities Industry Registration) on taking employment at securities firm. Both courts
held that no knowing waiver of the right to litigate statutory claims occurred,
the arbitration clauses contained in the form.
notwithstanding
170 See Wilson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 190 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1983) (arbitration clause in
medical agreement enforceable in claim for prenatal injuries by child who became
member of health plan at birth). See also Rojas v. TK Communications, 87 F.3d 745
(5th Cir. 1996) (sexual harassment claim held arbitrable); Stedor Enter. v. Armtex, Inc.,
947 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1991) (enforcement of arbitration agreement in fabric sale
confirmation even though document unread and unsigned); Johnson v. Hubbard Broad.,
Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996) (arbitration agreement enforceable against
former employee who brought race discrimination claim); Golenia v. Bob Baker
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of mail-order goods.' 7' Employment contracts, particularly when implicating
charges of discrimination, have supplied a particularly fertile ground to test the
Likewise, malpractice claims against
validity of arbitration agreements.'
hospitals and other health care organizations have fertilized legal development

Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding arbitrable a claim under Americans
with Disabilities Act).
171 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997)
(arbitration clause in box containing computer ordered by mail and not returned within
thirty days; court stated that "[a] contract need not be read to be effective."), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(terms
of arbitration clause inside software box).
172 See Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding discrimination claims related to race and age are arbitrable only if a worker explicitly consents;
union cannot through collective bargaining agreement contract away an individual
member's right to litigate statutory rights claims), cert. denied, 1997 WL 275009; Cole
v. Bums Int. Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (racial discrimination claim
subject to arbitration, but employer may not require employee to pay arbitrators' fees).
See also Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 1997); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Lai 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., No. 96-12267-NG, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 877 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 1998)
(discussed supra note 79). For background on arbitration of employment claims, see
Gihner v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (199 1) (allowing arbitration of
age discrimination claims); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974)
(employee may litigate discrimination claim notwithstanding arbitration clause in
collective bargaining agreement). Among the grounds on which the Supreme Court in
Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denverwas that the latter case involved a collective
bargaining agreement (rather than an individual employment contract) which did not
authorize the union to resolve statutory discrimination claims; in other words, consent
to arbitration of the claim was lacking. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has also issued a policy statement taking the position that agreements
which, as a condition of employment, impose binding arbitration of employment
discrimination claims are "contrary to the fundamental principles evinced in" American
employment discrimination laws. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997).

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 17:213

in this area. 73 In all events, the voluntary nature of forum selection agreements
74
tends to be a highly fact-specific matter.
In Europe, consumer protection regulations 175 have been applied to both
pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements. 7 6 These regulations
invalidate unfair contract terms which, depending on the circumstances, can
include provisions that were not individually negotiated and which, to the
consumer's detriment, cause a "significant imbalance in the parties' rights and
obligations."'" Similar restrictions designed to protect consumers have been79
written into jurisdiction and judgments treaties' and some national statutes.1
e.g., Colorado Permanente Med. Group v. Evans, 926 P.2d 1218 (1996) (Colo.
1996) (holding HMO arbitration clause unenforceable for failure to comply with
statutory form requirement); Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 687 (Cal.
1976) (reversing order denying arbitration and remanding for further proceedings);
Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (arbitration
agreement not enforced). See also supra note 167, discussing Engalla v. Permanente
Med. Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997), and supra note 170, discussing cases which
found arbitration agreements enforceable.
'74 On consent in contract, see generally Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A
173See,

Critique of Ian MacNeil's Relational Theory of Contract,78 V. L. REV. 1175 (1992);

Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract,86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986). On
consent to arbitration agreements in a labor contract, see Stephen J. Ware, Employment
Arbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 83 (1996).

"s See Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L95) 29 (Apr. 21, 1993).
176 For the extension of these regulations to arbitration in England, see Arbitration Act,
1996, § 89 (Eng.).
177U.K. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations (1994) §§ 3 & 4. Consumers
include individuals acting for purposes outside their business. Id. §2. One schedule to
these Regulations contains an illustrative list of contract terms that may be regarded as
unfair, and therefore non-binding. This list includes an oddly worded reference to terms
that require consumers to "take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal
provisions." Sched. 3, § I(g). It is not immediately clear what is meant by this curious
phraseology, lifted verbatim from the European Directive whose mandates were
implemented by the British rules.
178 See, e.g., Bruxelles Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, arts. 13-17, Sept. 27, 1968, as amended, 1990 O.J. (C
189) 1; andLugano Convention on Jurisdiction & Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
& Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9 (Sept. 16, 1988).
179 Swiss statute provides for restricted enforcement of court selection clauses that
"abusively" deny the protection of Swiss law, and gives consumers a right (not waivable
until after a dispute has arisen) to sue a supplier either at the consumer's residence or
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Moreover, some nations further restrict the use of both arbitration agreements 80
and court selection clauses' in contracts not concluded between "merchants,"
a term of art including persons contracting in a commercial capacity.
The United States lags behind its European trading partners in addressing
the matter of arguably abusive arbitration clauses. This lack of any statutory
anti-abuse regime for arbitration in the United States 82 has led to a lively
dialogue among scholars concerning how fair and voluntary arbitration
agreements really are,' particularly in securities transactions," and employ

the supplier's place of business. See Loifidralesur le droit internationalpriv6, arts.

5(2), 114 (Switz.).

'8o See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C.CIV.], art. 2061 (Fr.) (generally prohibiting a pre-dispute

arbitration clause (clausecompromissoire)).Compare provisions allowing post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate (compromis), C.Clv., art. 2060 (Fr.), as well as pre-dispute
arbitration between merchants (commergants), CODE DE COMMERCE [C.COM.], art. 631
(Fr.).
18'

See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.], art. 48 (Fr.) (prohibiting

court selection clauses unless concluded between merchants). Similar legislation exists
in Germany with respect to forum selection clauses (Gerichtsstandsklausel)except
between merchants (Kaufleute). See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG § 38 (Ger.).

In both the House and the Senate, however, bills are currently being considered to
curb "involuntary application of arbitration" to employment discrimination claims. See
Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1997, S. 63 and H.R. 983, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess., making, inter alia, the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1994),
inapplicable to any claim of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age or disability.
182

83

' See THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES & MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION,
Ch. 7 (1997); Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration as Contract: One More Word About
First Options v. Kaplan, 12 (No. 3) MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REPS. 21 (March 1997);
Thomas Carbonneau, Le Torumoi of Academic Commentary On Kaplan: A Reply to

ProfessorRau, 12 (No. 4) MEALY'S INT'L ARB. REPS. 35 (April 1997); Paul Carrington
& Paul Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (1997); Thomas
Carbonneau, ArbitralJustice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 1945 (1996); Thomas Carbonneau, Beyond Trilogies:A New Bill ofRights and
Law Practice through the Contract of Arbitration,6 AM. REV. INT. ARB. 1 (1995);
Thomas Carbonneau, Arbitration and the US. Supreme Court: A Pleafor Statutory

Reform, 5 J. DISP. RESOL. 231 (1990).
18 See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Fair Play, Consent and Securities Arbitration: A

Comment on Speidel, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1365 (1996); Richard E. Speidel, Contract
Theory andSecuritiesArbitration: Whither Consent?,62 BROOK. L. REV. 1335 (1996);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral
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ment contracts." 5 Some scholars have referred to proceedings under pre-dispute
arbitration agreements as "compelled" arbitration,' implying lack of consent,
notwithstanding that the contract was signed. And a least one Supreme Court
Justice has labeled arbitration as "despotic decision making."'8 7 These thinkers
thus resist limitations on judicial discretion to refuse enforcement of such
litigation control devices, arguing that only mischief comes from recognizing
a dispute resolution mechanism that may impose a forum predisposed toward
the stronger contracting party, or facilitate avoidance of mandatory public
policies.
When the rhetoric is moderated, the real terms of the debate might best be
framed as whether public policy should allowpre-disputeconsent to arbitration.
The opportunity to seek justice in otherwise competent courts, it might be
argued, is more fundamental than other contract terms, and thus should be nonwaivable until after a controversy has arisen, when parties better understand
specifically what is at stake. Under this approach, when a contract contains both
an 8.75% mortgage rate and a renunciation of the mortgagee's right to her day
in court, the latter term is so much more vital than the former as to be arguably
incapable of abandonment until the contours of a precise dispute appear on the
near horizon.
Complicating matters in the United States is a Supreme Court decision
holding that state law may not impose on arbitration agreements requirements
inapplicable to other contracts. 88 Consumer finance agreements, particularly
credit card contracts, often provide that they may be altered upon written mailed
notice to the consumer unless objection is made within a specified period, such
as thirty days. A state law requiring an arbitration clause to be signed by both
parties would arguably subject arbitration agreements to greater restrictions than

and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1381 (1996).
Infatuation
'8 5 See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA
L.8 6 REV. 83 (1996).
' See David S. Schwartz, EnforcingSmall Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33
(1997).
187 See Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 657 (1985)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
188 See Doctor's Assoc. v. Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652 (1996) (holding that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts a state notice requirement requiring arbitration clauses to be
on the first page of a contract), discussed infra at note 198.
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applicable to other contracts, and thus run afoul of the Supreme Court ruling.'8 9
C. Multi-party and Multi-contract Problems'9"
The rules of some arbitral institutions allow voluntary consolidation of
related arbitrations. 9 ' For better or for worse, however, the Federal Arbitration
Act does not authorize forced consolidation of different arbitration proceedings,
even if they present similar questions of law and fact.'92 Therefore, a company
may be whipsawed by inconsistent results in connected financial disputes,
unless arbitration takes place in a state that does provide for forced joinder of
related claims. 93 And when a dispute implicates a party that has not signed any
arbitration clause at all, consolidation of claims may be not just difficult, but
completely impossible.
An arbitration may occasionally include several parties on one side of the
proceedings. For example, in a contractual relationship involving three
companies, two entities might be co-defendants. In such a procedural configuration, particular care must be taken in establishing the arbitral tribunal. Conflict
or stalemate may occur if two defendants must agree to share one party"' This is exactly what happened in Christine Williams v. Direct CableandBeneficial

National Bank, a decision in which an Alabama Circuit Court granted a motion to
compel arbitration pursuant to a "mail out change" to a credit agreement on the theory
that to refuse enforcement to the modification would "place arbitration contracts in an
inferior position to other contracts." See Christine Williams v. Direct Cable and
Beneficial National Bank, No. CV-97-009 (Ala. Cir. Ct. for Henry County, Aug. 13,
1997).
0oSee generallyPhilippe Leboulanger, Multi-ContractArbitration,13 J. INT'L ARB. 43
(1996); Michael Mustill, MultipartitieArbitrations:An Agenda for Lawmakers, 7 J.
INT'L ARB. 393 (1991).
'91 See Arbitration Rules, London Court of Int'l Arb., art. 13.1 (1985) (Eng.).
19 See United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1993).
'9' See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 251, § 2A (1988) (calling for consolidation, as
provided in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits joinder of
actions "involving a common question of law or fact"). See also New England Energy,
Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that federal courts
sitting in Massachusetts may order consolidation of related arbitrations pursuant to state

statute). Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.3 (West 1971), with ARBITRATION
ORDINANCE, Ch. 351, § 6B (H.K.) (applicable to domestic arbitration), and CODE OF
CIVIL ARBITRATION LAW PROCEDURE § 1046 (Neth.).
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*nominated arbitrator. Attempts to impose one arbitrator on two parties have
sometimes been resisted as a denial of "equality of treatment." 94

D. Federal-State Conflicts
In the United States, federal arbitration law will usually preempt
application of more restrictive state rules. 95 However, it is often unclear exactly
which state laws will be considered restrictive, particularly when they have no
analogue in the Federal Arbitration Act. For example, some courts refuse preaward attachment in non-maritime arbitration, reasoning that by agreeing to
arbitration parties have implicitly excluded intervention by national courts until
an award is rendered.'" Other courts view pre-award attachment as a way to
maximize the efficiency of the arbitral process. 97
With respect to the initial formation of arbitration agreements, state law
cannot discriminate against arbitration by erecting obstacles to the validity of
arbitration clauses that do not apply to other contractual commitments. The
United States Supreme Court recently struck down a state "notice requirement"
calling for arbitration clauses to be in capital letters on the first page of the

'94

See, e.g., Siemens and BKMI v. Dutco, French Cour de Cassation, Ch. Civile No. 1

(Jan. 7, 1992), 1992 REV. ARB. 470.
5
See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminex
19
Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). Preemption will not only occur in federal courts,
but also in state court actions involving interstate commerce. See Southland v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984). For a study of federal-state conflicts engendered by state adoption
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, see Alan S. Rau, The UNCITRAL Model Arbitration
Law in State and Federal Courts: The Case of Waiver, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 223
(1995).
"9See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d Cir. 1974)
(denying pre-award attachment); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane S.A., 442 N.E.2d
1239 (N.Y. 1982). See generally David Wagoner, Interim Relief in International
Arbitration,DisP. RESOL. J. 68, 70 (Oct. 1996).
197
See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977)
(pre-award attachment allowed).
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contract.'" 8 The Court found such threshold limitations on arbitration agreements undermined the goals and policies of the Federal Arbitration Act.' 99
Aside from this limitation, state law generally governs whether, and what,
two contracting parties agreed to arbitrate."0 Some authorities, however, argue
that international arbitration agreements are subject to the law agreed upon by
the parties, orto a supra-national standard that incorporates only "internationally
recognized defenses" to contract enforcement, such as duress, fraud and
waiver. 20 '

More rather than less conflict between federal and state law is likely, as
some states attempt to implement consumer protection measures, and others
enact their own international arbitration statutes in the form of the UNCITRAL

198 See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996). For an application of
Doctor'sAssocs., see Huntington International v. Armstrong World Industries, No. 97CV-699, available in 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17514 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997)
(arbitration clause in manufacturer's Terms and Conditions of Sale binding on plaintiff
sales agent although not signed by sales agent), and Little v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1997 WL
622739 (Vt. Oct. 10, 1997) (arbitration clause contained in insurance contract valid
notwithstanding Vermont statute making arbitration clauses in insurance contracts
revocable). For a critique of Doctor's Assocs., see Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and
UnconscionabilityAfter Doctor'sAssociates v. Casarotto,31 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1001 (1996). A similar approach was taken in Securities Ind. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883
F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989).
199 For a case applying this principle to a credit agreement, see Christine Williams v.
Direct Cable and Beneficial National Bank, No. CV-97-009 (Ala. Cir. Ct. for Henry
County, Aug. 13, 1997), discussed supra note 189.
200 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (the Court,
however, added a qualification to the effect that "courts should not assume that the
parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability [i.e., existence and scope of arbitrators
jurisdiction] unless there is 'clear and unmistakable' evidence that they did so."). See
also, dicta in Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). Analysis of the role of
state law generally turns on the "savings clause" in Federal Arbitration Act § 2. See 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (limiting enforcement of arbitration agreements by the qualification
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."). It is unclear from the text of § 2 whether federal or state law should supply
the grounds "at law or in equity" for invalidating the arbitration clause. See id
201 See generally Rhone Poulenc v. Achille Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3d Cir. 1983)
(recognizing an arbitration clause notwithstanding possible invalidity under the
peculiarities of Italian law); GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
INTHE UNITED STATES 269-77 (1994).
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Model Law. The Federal Arbitration Act, unlike the arbitration law of several
European countries, does not distinguish between domestic and international
arbitration, nor does it shelter consumers from abusive arbitration agreements.

E. Arbitral Jurisdiction
1. The Consensual Foundation
An arbitrator's power derives from the consent of the parties to a
dispute.2" 2 Absent this consent, commercial arbitrators will normally have no
connection to the controverted events sufficient to justify deference to their
authority.2 3 While parties to arbitration assume the risk that the arbitrator may
get it wrong on the merits of the dispute, this does not mean that arbitrators - or
would-be arbitrators - should have power to decide matters never submitted to
them.
Judges get involved in determining the contours of arbitrator jurisdiction
for the simple reason that the arbitral process exists in the shadow of public
coercion. Directly and indirectly the state lends its power to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate. Court proceedings are stayed; arbitral awards are given
resjudicataeffect; and the loser's assets may be seized.
The integrity of the judicial system that enforces the arbitral process will
of necessity require courts to examine arbitrator jurisdiction comprehensively
and independently of the arbitrators' own ruling on their jurisdiction. There may
be nothing wrong with a bit of decorative hypocrisy designed to show

The state may, of course, supplement the parties' express mission to the arbitrator
with standards of fairness and procedural regularity that are imposed as a condition for
recognition of the arbitral award. But the origin of the arbitrator's power lies in an act
evidencing the parties' intent to waive the otherwise applicable rules of judicial
jurisdiction in favor of private adjudication.
203 So-called court-annexed arbitration within the United States rests on a different
footing, of course. In reality this process usually constitutes conciliation more than
arbitration, since the parties normally retain a right to a de novo trial. See 28 U.S.C. §
655 (1994). Also misleading is the label given to "arbitration" of minor claims
mandated by some state statutes, whereby the state delegates (or maybe franchises?) its
adjudicatory function to an organization such as the American Arbitration Association.
See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 65B.525 (1996) (requiring arbitration of motor vehicle accident
claims not in excess of ten thousand dollars).
202
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sensitivity to an arbitrator's pride. "Needless to say," ajudge might write in his
opinion, "we must give serious consideration to the distinguished arbitrator's
views" - while all the time the judge is thinking that this is one of those awards
that has to be seen to be believed. Such formal courtesies aside, however,judges
must make up their own minds on jurisdictional matters. Shallow judicial
can make little sense either in logic
examination of an arbitrator's jurisdiction
4
2
or in sound arbitration policy. 1

The parties' intent must be the lodestar for allocating tasks betweenjudges
and arbitrators. Controversy over who decides what should be resolved by
asking the question: "Did (or should) the parties expect that the particular issue
would be decided by a court or by the arbitral tribunal?" Sometimes the right
answer will be clear,2"5 while at other times reasonable people may differ. 6 In
no event, however, should a blanket presumption of arbitrability take the place
of an inquiry into what exactly the parties agreed to arbitrate as interpreted in
the context of the relevant transaction.

The type of limited inquiry that verifies only the "primafacie existence" of the
arbitration clause may be fine for an arbitral institution deciding only whether to allow
a claim to go to the arbitrator. But national courts reviewing arbitral awards should not
confuse their role with that of the arbitral institution. Consider the problematic approach
taken by the court in Apollo Computer v. Berg, 886 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1989). See also
the case's sequel in Hewlett-Packard v. Berg, 61 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995).
205 For example, it would be hard to imagine that an arbitrator would have power to
determine the validity of his or her own appointment. If the contract says: "Arbitration
under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce," few if any courts would
want to enforce an award rendered by arbitrators appointed by the American Arbitration
Association. Likewise, arbitrators would not normally have the final word on whether
an arbitration clause binds related entities. See, e.g., Marathon Oil v. Ruhrgas, 115 F.3d
315 (5th Cir. 1997).
206 Time bars to arbitration present the quintessential ambiguity about who decides a
jurisdictionally-related issue. A brokerage firm might say that the stock purchase giving
rise to the customer's complaint occurred in 1989, thus depriving the arbitrator of power
to hear the case under a rule requiring claims to be brought within six years from the
relevant event. The customer, however, might maintain that the relevant purchase
occurred in 1990, thus making the claim eligible for arbitration. There is nothing
inherently absurd about having the date of the securities purchase be decided either by
an arbitrator or by a court. See discussion of time bars and PaineWebber v. Elahi, 87 F.
3d 589 (1st Cir. 1996), supra notes 86-92.
204
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2. Loan Workouts: A Case Study
How, when and by whom an arbitrator's jurisdiction is determined can
a
have critical impact on an arbitration. The United States Supreme Court has
recently addressed this matter in FirstOptions of Chicago v. Kaplan,2°7 a case
that arose from an investment company's loan restructuring. The company, but
not its shareholders, signed a workout agreement providing for arbitration of
any disputes arising from the debt rescheduling. Nevertheless, an arbitral
tribunal pierced the corporate veil to render an award against the owners as well
as their company.
In considering the allocation of functions between judges and arbitrators,
a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed a lower court ruling that the owners had
not agreed to be bound to arbitration. The arbitrator'sjurisdiction was a question
for the courts.
The court in First Options, however, also suggested in dicta that in some
cases courts must defer to the arbitrators' decision on their own jurisdiction. 0
If the scope of arbitral jurisdiction was itself submitted to arbitration, the Court
said, arbitrators' jurisdictional determination would be shielded from independent judicial scrutiny. 9
While this dicta may make sense in some contexts, in most situations it
says either too much or too little. If awards may still be reviewed for excess of
514 U.S. 938 (1995). See generallyWilliam W. Park, The ArbitrabilityDictain First
v. Kaplan, 12 ARB. INT'L 137 (1996).
Options
20 The potentially troublesome dicta (which in some situations may eclipse the holding
of the case) reads as follows:
207

If [the parties agreed to submit arbitrability to arbitration] then the court's
standard for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about the matter should
not differ from the standard courts apply when they review any other
matter that the parties have agreed to arbitrate .... That is to say, the
court should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his
or her decision only in certain narrow circumstances.
514 U.S. 938, 943 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
209 The Court stated that, in such cases, review must be conducted according to the
"narrow" standard found in Federal Arbitration Act § 10. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994)
(listing grounds for vacatur that include fraud, excess of authority, partiality or
corruption, and arbitrator misbehavior prejudicing the rights of any party). See also 514
U.S. at 942.
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authority under the Federal Arbitration Act, judicial deference to arbitrators'
decisions on jurisdiction may be an illusion. On the other hand, lawyers
straining to give meaning to the dicta might interpret the pronouncement so
liberally (and incorrectly) to permit an inappropriate degree of arbitral
autonomy. 1 On balance, this dicta on "arbitration of arbitrability" may lend
itself to a series of misunderstandings that open the door to more problems than
it resolves.
It has always been problematic to draw the thin line between an
arbitrator's simple (and non-reviewable) error of fact or law, and an arbitrator's
excess of authority (normally subject to judicial review). AfterFirst Options,
however, judges will ask not only whether arbitrators exceeded their jurisdiction, but also whether the excess of jurisdiction deserves judicial deference.
An agreement giving arbitrators sole competence to rule on their own
jurisdiction would make sense principally (perhaps only) when contained in a
subsequent contract that provided for arbitration of a dispute about jurisdiction
that had arisen under a pre-existing arbitration agreement. For example, a bank
might assert that an arbitration clause bound a borrower's parent corporation as
well as the subsidiary, on the theory that the subsidiary had contracted the loan
as agent for the parent. Nothing would prevent the parent from agreeing, after
the dispute arose, to ask an arbitrator to determine whether it was in fact bound
by the arbitration clause. The arbitral tribunal to whose authority the parent has
consented underthe second agreement would be convened to determine whether
the parent bound itself under the first agreement.2 '

e.g., Kevin Flowers, Note on FirstOptions v. Kaplan, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 801, 809 (stating that the dicta "may simply lead parties with powerful
bargaining positions [like First Options] to include clearly worded clauses conferring
jurisdictional decision-making authority on the arbitral tribunal."). The implication here
is that the contract language would work to insulate from judicial review an arbitrator's
arrogation of power over the Kaplans, notwithstanding lack of their signature on the
relevant agreement. Yet it is hard to see how any change in contract language would
bind shareholders to an arbitration agreement they never signed.
211 This is exactly what happened in Astro Valiente Compania Naviera SA v. Pakistan
Min. of Food & Agriculture (The Emmanuel Colocotronis) [1982] (No. 2) 1 All E.R.
823 (1982).
210 See,

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 17:213

3. Jurisdiction to Decide Jurisdiction
The question of who determines an arbitrator's jurisdiction is sometimes
analyzed by reference to a much-misunderstood concept referred to as
comp~tence-compdtence (literally "jurisdiction on jurisdiction"), which links
together a constellation of disparate notions about arbitrators' rulings on the
limits of their own power. In its simplest form, "jurisdiction to decide
to
jurisdiction" means only that there is no need to stop an arbitration in order
2 2 If
proceedings.
the
during
arising
matters
jurisdictional
of
review
court
seek
a parent corporation objects to being joined to an arbitration on the theory that
its subsidiary signed an agreement on its behalf, the arbitral tribunal can
examine the agency question for itself. However, if the arbitrators decide they
have power over the parent, this determination would normally be subject tode
novo judicial review. Moreover, in most countries a court could examine the
agency question even before an award is rendered, for example if a motion is
made to stay litigation and/or to compel arbitration.
In France compdtence-compitence is linked with a rule requiring delay of
judicial review of arbitral jurisdiction until after an award is rendered. If an
arbitral tribunal has not yet been constituted, court litigation can go forward
23
only if the alleged arbitration agreement is clearly void (manifestementnulle).
And once an arbitral tribunal has begun to hear a matter, courts must wait to
4
look atjurisdictional questions until the arbitrators have rendered their award."
Swiss law provides that an arbitral tribunal shall rule on its own jurisdiction, normally through an interlocutory decision,2" 5 and that objections to arbitral
jurisdiction must be raised prior to any defense on the merits.216 However, Swiss
law contains nothing equivalent to Article 1458 of the FrenchNouveauCode de
Procedure Civile, requiring courts to refrain from hearing challenges to the
validity of the arbitration clause until the end of the arbitration. On the contrary,
Swiss courts will verify the existence of an arbitration clause, at least in a
summary fashion (l'existence prima facie), when asked to hear a dispute
allegedly covered by an agreement to arbitrate.21 7 Moreover, when the arbitral
212 See Christopher

Brown v. Genossenschaft Osterreichischer Waldbesitzer, [ 1954] 1

8, 12 (1984).
Q.B.
213
See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.D.], art. 1458 (Fr.).
214 See id.
215 Loifidrale sur le droit internationalprivg, art. 186 (Switz.).
216 See id., art. 186(2).
217
See id., arts. 7 and 176.
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seat lies outside of Switzerland, the Swiss Tribunalfiddralhas recently called
for a full examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement,21 ' an inquiry
which would generally occur at the time the clause is invoked in a Swiss court
action on the merits of the dispute brought in disregard of the alleged arbitration
clause. 1 9
To some extent, the issue here is one of timing. Court inquiry into arbitral
jurisdiction at the beginning of the proceedings can save expense for a
defendant improperly joined to the arbitration on the basis of a clause that is
either invalid or too limited in scope. On the other hand, judicial resources may
be conserved by delaying review until the end of the process, when the parties
may have settled. In this connection, Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model
Arbitration Law gives the arbitral tribunal an explicit right to determine its own
jurisdiction in the form of an interim award subject to challenge within thirty
(30) days.
German courts and scholars in the past used the expression KompetenzKompetenz to describe a type of "jurisdiction to decide jurisdiction" quite
different from that known in the rest of the world, often leading to a considerable amount of confusion. Kompetenz-Kompetenz contemplated a situation not

218 See

Compagnie de Navigation et Transports S.A. v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping
Company S.A., ATF 121 III 38, 42 (Tribunal f~dral, Jan. 16, 1995) (Fr.) (stating "si
le tribunal arbitral Ason sifge i l'dtranger, le juge dtatique suisse, devant lequel une
exception d'arbitrage est soulevde, doit statuer sur ce moyen de d6fense avec plein
pouvoir d'examen quant aux griefs soulevds, et en particulier celui ddduit de l'article
II al. 3 de la Convention de New York, sans pouvoir se limiter a un examen prima
facie."). See also Jean-Frangois Poudret and Gabriel Cottier, Remarquessur I 'Application de ArticlelIde la Convention de New York, 13 ASA BULL. 383 (1985). The authors
question the decision, writing "Si cette solution doit certes etre approuvde, la motivation
qui la soutient repose toutes fois sur une distinction peu convaincante et meme infondde
.... "1Id at 387.
219 The logic of this distinction seems to be that when arbitration occurs abroad, Swiss
courts may not later get a chance to correct an arbitrator's erroneous decision about
jurisdiction under the questionable agreement. For the attitude of Swiss courts towards
post-award review of arbitrator jurisdiction, see Transport-en Handelsmaatschappij
"Vekoma" B.V. v. Maran Coal Company (Civil Division 1,Aug. 17, 1995) [hereinafter
Vekoma], reprintedin 14 (No. 4) ASA BULL. 673 (1996) (commentary by Philippe
LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W.
OF
COMMERCE ARBITRATION (3d
CHAMBER
PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL

Schweizer). The Vekoma decision is discussed in W.

ed. 1998).
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unlike the dicta of First Options v. Kaplan,2 2 in which a contract might
empower arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction in a binding way, without
subsequent judicial review. 22' The proposed reform of German arbitration law
(adopting the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law), however, is expected to
eliminate this form of Kompetenz-Kompetenz.2m

4. Separability 2 2
Compdtence-compitence analysis has sometimes been confused with the
concept of "separability." Both legal doctrines deal with arbitral jurisdiction, but
they remain functionally quite distinct.
The notion that an arbitration clause is "separable" or autonomous from
the commercial agreement in which it is encapsulated permits arbitrators to
invalidate the main contract (e.g., for illegality or fraud in the inducement)
without the risk that their decision will also invalidate the source of their
power.

224

The doctrine of separability does not, however, give the arbitrator the right
to pass bindingly upon alleged infirmities in the arbitration clause itself. Courts
can still hear arguments that the arbitration clause is invalid (whetherab initio
or due to subsequent events such as rescission), and such arguments may
See supratext accompanying notes 207-11.
discussed in PETER SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT § 556 (1989).
DER
222
220

22' See decisions of the BundesGerichtshof

SeeEntwrfeines GesetzeszurNeuregelungdesSchiedsverfahrensrechts, July 1995,

at 132 (commentary) (stating that after adoption of draft law § 1040 (the equivalent of
UNCITRAL Model Law Art. 16), courts will always have the last word on arbitral
jurisdiction).
2 For a recent codification of the separability doctrine, see Arbitration Act, 1996, § 7
(Eng.). The English Act carefully avoids the type of confusion that has arisen in some
minds between separability and the doctrine of comp6tence-comp6tence, by also
providing that English courts will not enforce an arbitration agreement that is "null and
void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed." Id., § 9(4).
224 Occasionally one hears suggestions that an estoppel doctrine could achieve the same
goal, by deeming a party who participated in the arbitration to have waived the right to
challenge the award. Such an approach, however, would not deal adequately with the
common situation in which an arbitrator rules on several claims and/or counterclaims,
but has jurisdiction only over some of them. Moreover, an estoppel or waiver doctrine
would likely encourage boycott of arbitral proceedings.
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usually be presented either at the beginning of the arbitration in a competing
court action or after the award is rendered in an action to set the award aside.225
To illustrate the difference between separability andcomptence-compdtence, assume that an arbitration clause has been included in a "Consulting
Agreement" entered into by an American bank seeking to obtain a license to
operate in a foreign country. If the bank wished to resist arbitration, it might
offer two defenses: (i) the person who signed the agreement was not authorized
to do so, and (ii) the agreement was void because payments thereunder were
earmarked to bribe government officials.
Separability notions would permit the arbitrators to find the main contract
void for illegality without destroying their power to do so under the arbitration
clause, but would not permit the arbitrators to decide whether the individual
who signed the agreement was authorized to do so. On the other hand,
compdtence-compitence principles would permit the arbitrators to examine the
validity of the signature, but would not save an award declaring the contract
void for illegality.
Unfortunately, not all lawyers take care to distinguish separability from
notions about the arbitrators' power to determine their own jurisdiction. One
occasionally hears scholarly attacks on separability suggesting that the doctrine
facilitates enforcement of agreements that are unconscionable or not based on
informed consent.
Properly understood, however, separability should not prevent a party
from resisting arbitration on the grounds of duress, unconscionability, lack of
informed consent or arbitrator excess of authority. Notwithstanding the
separability doctrine, courts can and do refuse to enforce an arbitration
agreement tainted by duress, unconscionability, or a signatory's lack of

225

With respect to the timing ofjudicial review, France is the only major legal system

that says courts must wait until the end of the arbitration to look at arbitral jurisdiction.

See NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCItDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C], art. 1458 (Fr.).

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 17:213

authority, 226 which render the clause itself void, voidable or otherwise
inoperative.227

CONCLUSION
The identity of the person who will decide a financial controversy often
matters as much as, or more than, the legal standards that purport to govern the
merits of the dispute. Rules by themselves have little power to prevent an unjust
decision by an antagonistic jury or a xenophobic judge. Neither will the fairest
and most favorable decision mean much in practice unless it can be enforced
against the loser's assets.
Against these twin concerns - biased adjudicators and unenforceable
judgments - lawyers in the financial service industry increasingly are called to
evaluate the relative reliability of arbitration agreements as contrasted to court
selection clauses. The effectiveness of each of these dispute resolution
mechanisms will depend largely on its context, both geographic and
transactional.
e.g., Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. v. E.F. Hutton, 925 F. 2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1991) (court determined whether individual who signed arbitration clause had requisite
authority to do so); Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997)
(permitting customer of health care provider to rescind contract for fraud in the
inducement after finding that care provider's self-administered arbitral system is
inherently subject to delays favoring provider-defendant); Teleserve Sys. v. MCI
Telecomm., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. Div. 1997) (deciding claims of unconscionability
and duress, in case involving a $204,000 arbitral filing fee found unjust and unconscionable on its face). See also Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit, 937 F. 2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991)
(involving a motion to compel arbitration of a dispute arising out of a Memorandum of
Intent to produce and distribute bananas). The court stated that "although it was the
court's responsibility to determine the threshold question of arbitrability, the district
court improperly looked to the validity of the contract as a whole." Id. at 471. In other
words, the lower court erred in not finding the arbitration clause valid because it
considered the Memorandum non-binding with respect to the substantive obligations
concerning banana production, and the binding effect of the Memorandum as a whole
was for the arbitrators. For a discussion of consent and consumer contracts, see supra
notes 169-89 and accompanying text.
227 The concept of an "inoperative" arbitration clause, while perhaps unfamiliar to
American contract lawyers, is drawn from the language of Article II of the New York
Arbitration Convention and some national arbitration statutes.
226 See,
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In some countries, court judgments will not benefit from enforcement
treaties, nor will jurisdiction clauses receive dispositive effect from any statute.
Moreover, court selection agreements may prove ineffective when judges are
unable or unwilling to allow the parties to thrust a case upon the court, due
either to limits on subject matter jurisdiction or to forum non conveniens
notions.
On the other hand, the New York Convention, now in force in over one
hundred countries, mandates enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards
throughout the world. Andforum non conveniens and subject matterjurisdiction
limits are unlikely to prevent arbitrators from hearing a case, assuming their fees
can be paid.
Arbitration, of course, suffers from its own sources of uncertainty. For
example, in many jurisdictions there exists no easy way to consolidate related
claims. And in some countries judicial decisions have unfortunately obscured
the process for monitoring arbitrator excess ofjurisdiction.
Before drafting a forum selection clause, therefore, counsel will need to
focus on several questions. Can ajudgment be rendered in a location where the
debtor has assets? If not, will an international treaty enforce the judgment of a
court with jurisdiction to hear the dispute? Is the debtor's country likely to
impose exchange controls? Will the courts entertain lender liability or punitive
damage claims against the banker? How costly and time consuming will a court
action prove to be? Will summary judgment procedure be available to the
lender?
Depending on the answers to these questions, an arbitration clause can
sometimes prove more reliable and efficient than a court selection agreement.
First, when a borrower's assets are located in countries that have not concluded
judgment treaties with the expected litigation forum, the New York Arbitration
Convention may be a more effective enforcement mechanism than local rules
about enforcement of foreign judgments. Second, when loans are subject to
possible exchange controls, an arbitration clause reduces the likelihood of an
Act of State defense to loan enforcement. Third, an arbitrator may be more
reasonable than a jury in considering a punitive damages claim, or a lender
liability action against a banker who has refused to advance additional funds or
extend the term of a loan. Finally, arbitration occasionally commends itself in
resolving documentary credit disputes more efficiently, and with more expertise,
than would a judicial proceeding.
The interplay of these diverse elements in financial transactions makes it
dangerous to rely on a "one size fits all" dispute resolution clause, based on
habit rather than informed analysis. Financial lawyers will need to learn to relish
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a substantial amount of nuance in crafting dispute resolution clauses appropriate
to the contours of each particular type of transaction. Solutions adopted now,
when financial arbitration remains embryonic, will create a path of dependency
that will affect reliability in financial transactions for years to come.
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Appendix I: Model Arbitration Clauses
I-1. Commercial Loan Agreement
1. All differences, controversies or claims arising in connection with, or
questions related to the present Loan Agreement shall be finally settled under
the Rules of Arbitration of the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA)228 by an arbitral tribunal composed of three arbitrators appointed in
accordance with said Rules.
2. In all cases the Presiding Arbitrator shall be a lawyer fluent in English [and/or
alternate language], experienced in international financial matters and not of the
same nationality as either party.
3. The place of arbitration shall be [ ].
4. The language of the arbitration shall be [ ].
5. The parties hereby exclude any right of appeal to any court on the merits of
the dispute.
6. Judgment on the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction over
the award or any of the parties or their assets.
7. This Agreement shall be governed and construed according to the laws of
[legal system to govern merits of the dispute and/or reference to UCP 500 for
documentary credit disputes], provided that any dispute relating to this
arbitration agreement or its implementation, including any challenge to the
arbitral award, shall be governed by the laws of [the arbitral situs].22 9 The
arbitral tribunal shall not decide in amiable composition, ex aequo et bono or
according to any other principles that substitute equitable considerations and
Alternative arbitral institutions include, by way of illustration, the International
Chamber of Commerce, the American Arbitration Association and the Chambre de
Commerce et d'Industrie de Gen~ve.
229 For difficulties that can arise from failure to specify an appropriate law applicable
to the arbitration agreement and procedure, particularly in a federal system, see Volt v.
228

Stanford, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), and Pepsico v. Officina Central de Asesoria, 945 F.

Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

276

ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW

[Vol. 17:213

fairness for the substantive law and/or rules applicable to the merits of the
dispute.
8. Nothing contained in this arbitration clause shall prevent either party from
seeking interim measures of protection in the form of pre-award attachment of
assets, or from seeking injunctive relief to enforce in courts of competent
jurisdiction rights related to pledges, mortgages and other security interests.
9. In the event that disputes arise under both this present Agreement and any
other document or instrument executed in connection with the transactions
contemplated hereby, or in the event any dispute arises implicating more than
two parties, such disputes shall be resolved in a consolidated arbitral proceeding
by a single arbitrator appointed by the LCIA.
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Appendix 1-2: World Bank General Conditions
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
GENERAL CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO LOAN AND
GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS

Article X, Section 10.04. Arbitration

(a) Any controversy between the parties to the Loan Agreement or the parties
to the Guarantee Agreement, and any claim by any such party against any other
such party arising under the Loan Agreement or the Guarantee Agreement
which has not been settled by agreement of the parties shall be submitted to
arbitration by an Arbitral Tribunal as hereinafter provided.
(b) The parties to such arbitration shall be the Bank on the one side and the

Borrower and the Guarantor on the other side.
(c) The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators appointed as follows:
one arbitrator shall be appointed by the Bank, a second arbitrator shall be
appointed by the Borrower and the Guarantor or, if they shall not agree, by the
Guarantor; and the third arbitrator (hereinafter sometimes called the Umpire)
shall be appointed by agreement of the parties or, if they shall not agree, by the
President of the International Court of Justice or, failing appointment by said
President, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If either side shall
fail to appoint an arbitrator, such arbitrator shall be appointed by the Umpire.
In case any arbitrator appointed in accordance with this Section shall resign, die
or become unable to act, a successor arbitrator shall be appointed in the same
manner as herein prescribed for the appointment of the original arbitrator and
such successor shall have all the powers and duties of such original arbitrator.
(d) An arbitration proceeding may be instituted under this Section upon notice
by the party instituting such proceeding to the other party. Such notice shall
contain a statement setting forth the nature of the controversy or claim to be
submitted to arbitration and the nature of the relief sought and the name of the
arbitrator appointed by the party instituting such proceeding. Within thirty days
after such notice, the other party shall notify to the party instituting the
proceeding the name of the arbitrator appointed by such other party.
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(e) If within sixty days after the notice instituting the arbitration proceeding, the
parties shall not have agreed upon an Umpire, any party may request the
appointment of an Umpire as provided in paragraph (c) of this Section.
(f) The Arbitral Tribunal shall convene at such time and place as shall be fixed
by the Umpire. Thereafter, the Arbitral Tribunal shall determine where and
when it shall sit.
(g) The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide all questions relating to its competence
and shall, subject to the provisions of this Section and except as the parties shall
otherwise agree, determine its procedure. All decisions of the Tribunal shall be
by majority vote.
(h) The Arbitral Tribunal shall afford to all parties a fair hearing and shall
render its award in writing. Such award may be rendered by default. An award
signed by a majority of the Arbitral Tribunal shall constitute the award of such
Tribunal. A signed counterpart of the award shall be transmitted to each party.
Any such award rendered in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall
be final and binding upon the parties to the Loan Agreement and the Guarantee
Agreement. Each party shall abide by and comply with any such award rendered.
by the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
(i) The parties shall fix the amount of the remuneration of the arbitrators and
such other persons as shall be required for the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings. If the parties shall not agree on such amount before the Arbitral
Tribunal shall convene, the Arbitral Tribunal shall fix such amount as shall be
reasonable under the circumstances. The Bank, the Borrower and the Guarantor
shall each defray its own expenses in the arbitration proceedings. The costs of
the Arbitral Tribunal shall be divided between them, borne equally by the Bank
on the one side and the Borrower and the Guarantor on the other. Any question
concerning the division of the costs of the Arbitral Tribunal or the procedure for
payment of such costs shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal.
(j) The provisions for arbitration set forth in this Section shall be in lieu of any
other procedure for the settlement of controversies between the parties to the
Loan Agreement and Guarantee Agreement or of any claim by any such party
against any other such party arising thereunder.
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(k) If, within thirty days after counterparts of the award shall have been
delivered to the parties, the award shall not be complied with, any party may:
(i) enter judgment upon, or institute a proceeding to enforce, the award in any
court of competent jurisdiction against any other party; (ii) enforce such
judgment by execution; or (iii) pursue any other appropriate remedy against
such other party for the enforcement of the award and the provisions of the
Loan Agreement or the Guarantee Agreement. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
this Section shall not authorize any entry of judgment or enforcement of the
award against any party that is a member of the Bank except as such procedure
may be available otherwise than by reason of the provisions of this Section.
(I) Service of any notice or process in connection with any proceeding under
this Section or in connection with any proceeding to enforce any award rendered
pursuant to this Section may be made in the manner provided in Section 11.01.
The parties to the Loan Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement waive any and
all other requirements for the service of any such notice or process.
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Appendix 1-3: European Bank Standard Terms
EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Article VIII, Section 8.04. Dispute Resolution

(a) The parties to the Loan Agreement and the Guarantee Agreement shall
endeavor to settle amicably any dispute or controversy between them arising out
of such agreements or in connection therewith. To this end, at the initiative of
any party to either such agreement, the other party or parties shall meet
promptly with the initiating party to discuss the dispute or controversy and, if
requested by the initiating party in writing, shall reply in writing to any written
submission made by the initiating party concerning the dispute or controversy.
(b) If any such dispute or controversy, or any claim relating thereto, cannot be
amicably settled as provided for in subsection (a), it shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in force at the
time the arbitral proceedings commence, subject to the following:
(i) The number of arbitrators shall be three (3);
(ii) The appointing authority for the purposes of the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules shall be the President of the International Court of
Justice;
(iii) The place of arbitration shall be The Hague;
(iv) The language to be used in the arbitral proceedings shall be English;
(v) The law to be applied by the Arbitral Tribunal shall be public
international law, the sources of which shall be taken for these purposes
to include:
(A) any relevant treaty obligations that are binding reciprocally on the
parties;
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(B) the provisions of any international conventions and treaties
(whether or not binding directly as such on the parties) generally
recognized as having codified or ripened into binding rules of customary law applicable to states and international financial institutions, as
appropriate;
(C) other forms of international custom, including the practice of states
and international financial institutions of such generality, consistency
and duration as to create legal obligations; and
(D) applicable general principles of law;
(vi) Notwithstanding the provisions of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
the Arbitral Tribunal shall not be authorized to take any interim measures
of protection or provide any pre-award relief against the Bank and none
of the parties to the Loan Agreement or Guarantee Agreement may
address to any judicial authority a request for any interim measures of
protection or pre-award relief against the Bank; and
(vii) The Arbitral Tribunal shall have authority to consider and include in
any proceeding, decision or award, any dispute or controversy properly
brought before it by the Bank, the Borrower, the Guarantor or the Project
Entity, insofar as such dispute or controversy arises out of the Loan
Agreement or the Guarantee Agreement; but subject to the foregoing no
other parties or other disputes shall be included in, or consolidated with,
the arbitral proceedings.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of this Section, nothing contained in these
Standard Terms and Conditions shall operate or be regarded as a waiver,
renunciation, or other modification of any right, privilege, or immunity of the
Bank under Chapter VIII of the Agreement Establishing the Bank or under any
applicable laws.
(d) In any arbitral proceeding arising out of the Loan Agreement or the
Guarantee Agreement, the certificate of the Bank as to any amount due to the
Bank under this Agreement shall be primafacie evidence of such amount.
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Appendix 1-4: Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF GUARANTEE FOR LOANS

Article 3. Dispute Resolution and Applicable Law
3.1 Any dispute between the Guarantee Holder and MIGA arising out of or
in connection with the Contract (other than disputes regarding the determ inatiori
of the Reference Rate of Exchange under Article 15) shall be settled by
arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Rules.23 ° Arbitration proceedings
shall be held in Washington, D.C.
3.2 No award may require MIGA to pay to the Guarantee Holder more than
the Maximum Aggregate Liability plus interest under Article 22, and the cost
of the arbitral proceeding.
3.3 The award of the Arbitral Tribunal shall be final and binding on the parties
and enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction. The parties shall carry
out the award without delay.
3.4 Subject to Section 3.5, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the Contract and
Convention, and to the extent that issues in dispute are not covered by the
Contract or the Convention, general principles of law.
3.5 All provisions of the Contract shall be presumed to be consistent with the
Convention and Operational Regulations. Such presumption may not be
challenged by either MIGA or the Guarantee Holder.

The "Rules of Arbitration for Disputes under Contract of Guarantee of the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency" ("MIGA") provide for appointment of one
arbitrator by each party, and the appointment of the president of the tribunal either on
230

concurrence of both parties or by the Secretary General if concurrence is not possible.

See MIGA Rules of Arbitration, arts. 10-11.
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